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Prosecutorial Shaming: 
Naming Attorneys to Reduce 
Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Adam M. Gershowitz∗ 
This Article explores the unfortunately large number of instances in 
which appellate courts reverse convictions for serious prosecutorial 
misconduct but do not identify the names of the prosecutors who committed 
that misconduct.  Because judges are reluctant to publicly shame 
prosecutors whose cases are reversed, this Article advocates that a neutral 
set of third parties undertake the responsibility of publicly identifying 
prosecutors who have committed serious misconduct.  The naming of 
prosecutors will shame bad actors, provide a valuable pedagogical lesson for 
junior prosecutors, and signal to trial judges that certain prosecutors must 
be monitored more closely to avoid future misconduct. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Prosecutors are the most powerful actors in the American criminal 
justice system.1  Unfortunately, in exercising that power, prosecutors 
occasionally2 cross the line and commit misconduct.3  This is not 
surprising.  Much prosecutorial misconduct stems from the fact that 
law schools and district attorneys’ offices often provide too little 
training demonstrating where to draw the line between aggressive 
prosecution and misconduct.4  Taking a glass-half-full approach, we 
can take solace in the fact that much prosecutorial misconduct is 
 
 1 See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE:  THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR 4 (2007) (“[P]rosecutors [hold] almost all of the cards.”); Bennett L. 
Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 393 (1992) (explaining that 
“prosecutors wield vastly more power than ever before”). 
 2 Because most criminal cases are resolved by plea bargains and not subject to 
appeal, there is often little opportunity to discover prosecutorial misconduct.  And in 
cases when defendants do go to trial, indigent defendants are sometimes represented 
by underpaid and overworked criminal defense lawyers who lack the time or the 
ability to recognize and preserve claims of prosecutorial misconduct.  See Tracey L. 
Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior:  Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct 
With Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 879, 890 n.140, 909, 915-16 
(1995) (noting that “anectdotal evidence indicates that prosecutorial misconduct 
occurs at a rate higher than is indicated in reported cases” and that “it is probably fair 
to say that many instances of Brady-type misconduct are never discovered”). 
 3 See generally BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, TRIAL ERROR AND MISCONDUCT (2007) 
(detailing types of errors and misconduct committed by prosecutors and other actors 
in criminal justice system); JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (2003) 
(providing thorough assessment of various types of prosecutorial misconduct). 
 4 See Rory K. Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in Their 
Investigative Role, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 723, 767-69 (1999) (discussing lack of ethics 
training provided by prosecutors’ offices); see also Jamison v. Collins, 100 F. Supp. 2d 
647, 673 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (granting writ of habeas corpus in capital case because 
prosecutors failed to turn over exculpatory evidence and noting that two lead 
prosecutors stated in their depositions that “they received no training from the 
Hamilton County Prosecutor’s Office as to what constituted exculpatory evidence”); 
Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the Misbehaving 
Prosecutor:  Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. 
L. 45, 63 (2005) (“[A]ssistant prosecutors generally have less training and experience 
prosecuting criminal cases.  Consequently, assistants are, for the most part, less 
familiar with state and federal constitutional strictures applicable to law enforcement, 
and more susceptible to inadvertent constitutional violations.”). 
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inadvertent5 and not prejudicial enough to necessitate reversing a 
defendant’s conviction.6 
What is surprising, and what certainly qualifies as a glass-half-empty 
perspective, is the tepid reaction from many judges when cases of 
serious misconduct come to light.  Appellate courts only overturn 
defendants’ convictions for prosecutorial misconduct when the 
prosecutors’ misdeeds are very serious and result in clear prejudice to 
the defendant.7  Yet when courts reverse these serious cases of 
misconduct, appellate courts often do not call out the offending 
prosecutors by name in judicial opinions.8  Rather, many judges go to 
great lengths to redact the names of misbehaving prosecutors from 
trial transcripts quoted in judicial opinions.9  And many prosecutors’ 
offices do not sternly discipline prosecutors whose cases have been 
overturned because of misconduct.10  In the absence of such public 
 
 5 See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Ethical Prosecutor’s Misconduct, 23 CRIM. L. BULL. 
550, 550 (1987) (arguing that primary causes of prosecutorial misconduct are 
endemic to system).   
 6 For criticism of the incentive structure that the harmless error doctrine creates 
for prosecutors, see, for example, Gershman, supra note 1, at 424-32. 
 7 See infra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
 8 Scholars have noted in passing that appellate courts often fail to mention 
prosecutors by name when reversing convictions.  See, e.g., Peter J. Henning, 
Prosecutorial Misconduct and Constitutional Remedies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 713, 830 
(1999) (“Yet, when faced with prosecutorial misconduct, some judges shy away from 
‘naming names’ and making it clear that a particular prosecutor has violated the norms 
of a government attorney.”); James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2126 (2000) (“[E]ven in the face of egregious behavior, orders 
announcing these reversals rarely single out anyone by name to bear the blame.”); 
Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal:  Prosecutorial Resistance to Post-Conviction Claims of 
Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 172-73 (2004) (“Indeed, few convictions are 
overturned by virtue of prosecutorial misconduct and, in the rare incidences of 
reversal, the appellate court opinions invariably neglect to identify the prosecutor by 
name.”); Paul J. Speigelman, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument:  The Role of 
Intent in Appellate Review, 1 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 115, 169-70 (1999) (finding that 
in survey of 45 federal cases reversed for improper arguments by prosecutors, only six 
decisions named prosecutor); see also United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 1186 
n.7 (2d Cir. 1981) (“We note that appellate courts have generally been reluctant to 
name the individual prosecutors whose comments have been found improper.  Among 
the many reported decisions of this Court in the last decade, apparently only two 
identify the prosecutor.”).  To date, however, there has not been a systematic analysis 
of this phenomenon. 
 9 See infra notes 50-59 and accompanying text. 
 10 See Ryan Patrick Alford, Catalyzing More Adequate Federal Habeas Review of 
Summation Misconduct:  Persuasion Theory and the Sixth Amendment Right to an 
Unbiased Jury, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 479, 489 (2006) (explaining how Los Angeles County 
District Attorney’s office resisted firing prosecutor responsible for multiple instances 
of misconduct, which culminated in rebuke by California Supreme Court); Barry 
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shaming for their misdeeds, there is little external pressure from the 
criminal justice system to prevent prosecutorial misconduct.11  Put 
simply, other than their own personal moral code, there is little 
incentive for prosecutors to avoid misconduct.12 
That prosecutors are not publicly called on the carpet for their 
misbehavior is troubling for three reasons.  First, sweeping 
misconduct under the rug allows rogue prosecutors to keep their jobs.  
In future cases, they will be free to commit further misdeeds that may 
lead to the conviction of the innocent and the reversal of convictions 
of those who are guilty.13  Second, because prosecutors are not named 
individually, criticism for their misconduct falls on the district 
attorney’s office as a whole.14  Rogue prosecutors thus sully the 
reputation of the entire office, leaving ethical prosecutors to labor 
under a cloud of misconduct.  Third, the failure to publicly identify 
the bad apples denies junior prosecutors a valuable pedagogical lesson 
that would help them to avoid similar mistakes.  At present, district 
attorney’s offices hire many junior prosecutors straight out of law 
school where they learn a considerable amount of doctrinal law but 
very little about how to make ethical decisions in everyday situations.  
And once law students transition to serve as full-time prosecutors, 
 
Tarlow, RICO Report, CHAMPION, Dec. 2001, at 56, 57-58 (discussing lack of 
punishment meted out by Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility). 
 11 See Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady 
Violations:  A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 697 (1987) (“[A]t present insufficient 
incentive exists for a prosecutor to refrain from Brady-type misconduct.”); see also 
Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L. REV. 
53, 68 (2005) (“Even when the appellate court reverses a conviction on grounds of 
prosecutorial misconduct, the prosecutor who engaged in the misconduct generally 
escapes any repercussions.”).  Of course, there is significant internal pressure for 
prosecutors to behave ethically because most have a strong moral code and a desire 
not to commit misconduct. 
 12 See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict:  Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 
10, 1999, at 1 (quoting Professor Bennett Gershman as saying, “There is no check on 
prosecutorial misconduct except for the prosecutor’s own attitudes and beliefs and 
inner morality”). 
 13 See Adam Liptak, Prosecutor Becomes Prosecuted, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2007, at 4 
(quoting University of Michigan Law School Professor Sam Gross as saying, “I don’t 
know of a single case of discipline against a prosecutor who engaged in misconduct 
that produced [a] wrongful conviction and death sentence, and many of the cases 
involve serious misconduct”). 
 14 See, e.g., Brian Rogers, DA’s Office Plugs Onward:  Prosecutors Say the Fallout 
from Rosenthal’s Misdeeds Stings, HOUST. CHRON., Jan 22, 2008, at B1 (quoting senior 
prosecutor as saying:  “You never know when you wake up and turn on the news what 
they’re going to be saying about us, globally.  We’re all clumped together on being 
unethical and racist and liars” because of misdeeds of one prosecutor). 
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district attorneys’ offices offer insufficient training to avoid the 
potential for misconduct that lurks around every corner.15  For 
prosecutors pressed with busy trial schedules, the public identification 
of their colleagues’ misconduct would have great pedagogical value. 
In an ideal world, appellate judges or high-level supervisors in 
district attorneys’ offices would publicly name prosecutors who 
commit misconduct.  But, for the most part, that does not happen.16  
In the absence of key players stepping forward, the next best solution 
is for a third party to serve as an honest broker that could bring the 
names of offending prosecutors to light. 
In recent years, many law schools have established “Innocence 
Projects” to work to free the wrongly convicted.17  This model could 
be used to create a “Prosecutorial Misconduct Project” that tracks 
instances in which appellate courts reverse cases due to prosecutorial 
misconduct.  The projects would focus on one or two core types of 
misconduct, such as failing to turn over favorable evidence to the 
defendant18 or striking prospective jurors based on race,19 both of 
which are common types of misconduct that violate longstanding 
United States Supreme Court precedent.20  If an appellate court’s 
decision did not name the offending prosecutor, project volunteers 
would then research and ascertain the prosecutor’s identity.  
Thereafter, the Prosecutorial Misconduct Project would distribute a 
list to defense lawyers, prosecutors, judges, and bar disciplinary 
committees that describes the facts that led to the reversals and 
identifies the prosecutors who litigated the cases.21 
 
 15 See, e.g., Dunahoe, supra note 4, at 63 (lamenting lack of training for assistant 
prosecutors). 
 16 See infra Part II. 
 17 See generally BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE:  WHEN JUSTICE GOES 
WRONG AND HOW TO MAKE IT RIGHT (2003) (chronicling wrongful convictions of 
innocents). 
 18 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (requiring prosecutors to 
disclose favorable and material evidence to defendant). 
 19 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 93-94 (1986) (forbidding racial 
discrimination in jury selection and creating burden-shifting test to demonstrate 
inappropriate strikes). 
 20 The Innocence Project, Understand the Causes:  Forensic Science Misconduct, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/Government-Misconduct.php (last visited 
Jan. 21, 2009) (listing suppression of exculpatory evidence as most common form of 
prosecutorial misconduct in DNA exonerations). 
 21 If there were a concern about neutrality, the project could be expanded to 
identify the names of defense lawyers whom courts had found to have provided 
unconstitutionally deficient representation.  Throughout this Article, I focus only on 
prosecutorial misconduct because courts do not appear to be reluctant to name 
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A law school’s role in its Prosecutorial Misconduct Project would 
not be to make judgments about the conduct of particular prosecutors; 
appellate courts reversing the underlying conviction would have 
already made that determination.  Instead, law schools would serve an 
information-forcing function, something that they are institutionally 
qualified to do.   
By regularly publishing the names of prosecutors who commit 
misconduct, patterns would begin to emerge.  The same prosecutors 
would likely show up repeatedly.22  And with the lists in the hands of 
defense lawyers, local bar associations, and judges, it would be far 
more difficult for supervisors in district attorneys’ offices to ignore the 
actions of offending prosecutors, thus raising a challenge to the 
culture of insulation that allows misconduct to go unpunished.23 
Part I of this Article explores instances in which appellate courts 
reversed criminal convictions for serious prosecutorial misconduct but 
did not name the prosecutors who committed the misconduct.  Part II 
then studies prosecutorial misconduct in capital cases and finds that 
judges are reluctant to identify misbehaving prosecutors by name, 
even when the defendant’s life was on the line.  In particular, Part II 
analyzes dozens of capital cases decided between 1997 and 2007 in 
which courts reversed convictions or death sentences for failure to 
turn over favorable evidence or for striking prospective jurors based 
on race.  Part II finds that judicial opinions mention prosecutors by 
name in less than half of these capital cases.  Part III then explores the 
reasons why judges and senior prosecutors are reluctant to publicly 
 
defense lawyers who have provided ineffective assistance of counsel.  See, e.g., 
Gershman, supra note 1, at 445 (“This failure to discipline prosecutors contrasts 
sharply with the fairly common use of disciplinary sanctions against private attorneys 
in civil and criminal matters.”); Mike McKee, Do Judges Mask Misconduct?  Prosecutors 
Are Often Unnamed When Opinions Blast Their Work, RECORDER, Aug. 8, 2006, at 1 
(explaining that appellate attorneys believe judges are reluctant to name misbehaving 
prosecutors but “courts don’t hesitate in naming — and disgracing — defense 
lawyers”).  Nevertheless, if the Prosecutorial Misconduct Project would be perceived 
as more neutral and therefore more effective, then it would be worthwhile to expand it 
to include defense lawyers. 
 22 See infra notes 48-49, 243-46 and accompanying text (discussing Center for 
Public Integrity’s database of thousands of cases of prosecutorial misconduct, 
including many repeat offenders). 
 23 See Barbara E. Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 453, 506 (2004) (discussing pervasive problem of supervisors tolerating 
police misconduct and stating that “a law enforcement organization that tolerates 
repeated, notorious instances of the worst kinds of brutality — even by a minority of 
police officers — effectively signals to its employees that a certain level of violence is 
acceptable despite formal policies to the contrary”). 
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shame or discipline prosecutors whose cases are reversed for 
misconduct.  Part IV first presents the burgeoning “shaming” 
literature, which debates whether shaming punishments should have a 
place in the criminal justice system.  It then briefly applies this 
literature to prosecutorial misconduct.  Finally, Part V details how 
third parties — namely law school “Prosecutorial Misconduct 
Projects” — could provide a valuable service by publicly naming 
prosecutors who commit misconduct. 
I. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT SEVERE ENOUGH TO REVERSE A 
CONVICTION BUT NOT TO NAME THE PROSECUTOR 
There are numerous ways for courts to reverse criminal convictions 
for prosecutorial misconduct, such as failing to turn over exculpatory 
evidence,24 selecting jurors based on unconstitutional criteria,25 or 
knowingly using perjured testimony,26 to name just a few.27  Yet, the 
number of successful challenges to convictions begotten through 
misconduct remains rare.  This is because prosecutorial misconduct 
claims are typically assessed under a harmless error standard.28  Thus, 
even when defendants can point to a constitutional violation, they still 
must face the difficult task of pointing to identifiable prejudice they 
have suffered because of the violation.29  Because courts are often 
reluctant to find errors to be harmful,30 we can safely conclude that 
 
 24 See infra notes 90-99 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 120-28 and accompanying text. 
 26 See Carissa Hessick, Prosecutorial Subornation of Perjury:  Is the Fair Justice 
Agency the Solution We Have Been Looking For?, 47 S.D. L. REV. 255, 256 (2002). 
 27 For a list of additional misconduct, see Dunahoe, supra note 4, at 69-70. 
 28 See Henning, supra note 8, at 721-22 (“[A] court need not precisely define 
prosecutorial misconduct because a finding of misconduct usually does not trigger 
relief unless the prosecutor’s acts undermined the fairness of the proceeding or 
confidence in the jury’s verdict.”). 
 29 See Lyn M. Morton, Seeking the Elusive Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct:  
Suppression, Dismissal, or Discipline?, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1083, 1103 (1994) 
(“[P]rosecutors are aware that as long as their ethical misconduct is not held to have 
substantially influenced the outcome of the trial, the prosecutor will not face dismissal 
or suppression.”). 
 30 Indeed, Professor Gershman argues that the harmless error doctrine has 
“unleash[ed] prosecutors from the restraining threat of appellate reversal” and that as 
a result, “many defendants have had their convictions affirmed despite clear 
prosecutorial overreaching.”  Gershman, supra note 1, at 427, 431; see also Hessick, 
supra note 26, at 263 (“A prosecutor with a strong case takes only a small risk in 
suborning perjury because under the harmless error rule, the court may decline to 
grant a new trial, in spite of perjured testimony[,] where evidence of a defendant’s 
guilt is overwhelming.”). 
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when a criminal conviction is reversed for prosecutorial misconduct 
there typically has been serious misconduct, not simply a 
“technicality.”31 
A. Omitting Names:  From the Supreme Court on Down, Justices and 
Judges Do Not Name Prosecutors Who Have Committed Misconduct 
If misconduct is important enough to reverse the conviction of a 
criminal defendant, then it would seem sensible that the public and 
particularly the legal community should know the name of the 
perpetrator of the misconduct.  Yet, courts often go out of their way to 
avoid publicizing the names of prosecutors.  The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Kojayan32 
is particularly instructive on this point. 
In an opinion by prominent Judge Alex Kozinski, the court in 
Kojayan reversed a conviction for conspiracy to possess heroin after it 
came to light that the Assistant United States Attorney had lied in 
open court about the availability of a witness and the fact that the 
witness had a cooperation agreement.33  In reversing the conviction, 
Judge Kozinski spoke in sweeping terms about how “lawyers 
representing the government in criminal cases serve truth and justice 
first.”34  The opinion has been cited nearly one thousand times35 and is 
standard reading in some prosecutors’ offices.36   
More noteworthy than Judge Kozinski’s prose, however, is the fact 
that he initially named the prosecutor forty-nine times in the slip 
opinion but subsequently deleted all references to the prosecutor’s 
name from the final version of the opinion published in the Federal 
Reporter.37  But Judge Kozinski did not act fast enough to permanently 
conceal the prosecutor’s identity; the legal database LexisNexis® had 
already uploaded the original version of the opinion that included the 
 
 31 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Harmless Error, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 
161, 161 (2001) (“Intentional prosecutor and judge errors are more likely to be found 
harmful and lead the appellate court to reverse the defendant’s conviction than are 
inadvertent errors.”). 
 32 8 F.3d 1315 (9th Cir. 1993). 
 33 Id. at 1318. 
 34 Id. at 1323. 
 35 An online search found 990 citing references (Westlaw Keycite, Feb. 16, 2009). 
 36 See Mary Whisner, When Judges Scold Lawyers, 96 LAW LIBR. J. 557, 557 n.2 
(2004) (“[T]he U.S. Attorney’s office reportedly gives the [Kojayan] case to 
‘[e]veryone who is trained there . . . because it really teaches a good lesson.’” (quoting 
Emily Bazelon, The Big Kozinski, LEGAL AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 23, 29)). 
 37 See Henning, supra note 8, at 830. 
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prosecutor’s name.38  When told about the original version being 
available on LexisNexis®, Judge Kozinski responded with surprise 
and “wince[d].”39 
Judge Kozinski is not alone in his desire to protect the identity of 
prosecutors who have committed severe misconduct.40  Although the 
United States Supreme Court has specifically stated that one way to 
discipline misbehaving prosecutors is to “publically chastise[] the 
prosecutor by identifying him in [the court’s opinion],” the Court has 
rarely followed its own advice.41   
In the 2004 case of Banks v. Dretke, the Supreme Court reversed a 
death sentence because prosecutors had deliberately withheld the fact 
that one key witness was a paid police informant and failed to notify 
the trial court that multiple witnesses had testified untruthfully.42  
Among other criticism, the Supreme Court explained that “the State 
persisted in hiding [the key witness’s] informant status and 
misleadingly represented that it had complied in full with its Brady [v. 
Maryland] disclosure obligations.”43 
Despite this egregious misconduct, the Court never identified the 
prosecutors involved.  Instead, in the introduction and factual history 
section of its opinion, the Court referred forty-two times to “the State” 
and “the prosecutors.”44  In many of these instances and other 
references throughout the body of the opinion, it would have made 
more sense grammatically to use the prosecutors’ actual names.45 
 
 38 See United States v. Kojayan, No. 91-50875, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 19873, at *7 
(9th Cir. Aug. 4, 1993). 
 39 Emily Bazelon, The Big Kozinski, LEGAL AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 23, 28.   
 40 For more background on the efforts by the U.S. Attorney’s Office to eliminate 
reference to the prosecutor’s name, see Henry Weinstein, U.S. Attorney Asks Court to 
Erase Criticism, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1993, at B1.  For another example of a court revising 
its opinion after its release to eliminate reference to the prosecutor, see United States v. 
Horn, 811 F. Supp. 739, 741 n.1 (D.N.H. 1992) (“The order has been revised to 
eliminate the name of the lead prosecutor.”).  And for an example of the Department of 
Justice unsuccessfully seeking to have a prosecutor’s name removed from an opinion, see 
Fred Zacharias, Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 764 n.150 
(2001) (discussing United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1993)). 
 41 United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 n.5 (1974) (noting usefulness of 
naming prosecutors but redacting name of prosecutor who had commented on 
defendant’s failure to testify and upholding conviction on harmless error grounds). 
 42 540 U.S. 668, 675 (2004). 
 43 Id. at 693. 
 44 See id. at 674-89. 
 45 For instance, it would have made much more sense to use the prosecutor’s 
actual name in the following sentence from the Court’s opinion:  “If it was reasonable 
for Banks to rely on the prosecution’s full disclosure representation, it was also 
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The Supreme Court’s failure to name prosecutors is merely the tip of 
the iceberg.  In 2003, the Center for Public Integrity released a study 
of more than 11,000 cases alleging prosecutorial misconduct in 
appellate opinions issued between 1970 and 2003.46  In 2,012 of those 
decisions, courts found the prosecutor’s misconduct sufficiently 
harmful to reverse the defendant’s conviction or sentence.47  Although 
the Center for Public Integrity did not compute the number of 
instances in which the prosecutor was identified by name, it did create 
an online database that listed all of the misconduct cases by state.  
Analyzing this database, I found that in the 2,012 cases reversed for 
prosecutorial misconduct, courts named the offending prosecutor in 
only 517 decisions.48  That amounts to courts naming prosecutors in 
approximately twenty-five percent of cases.49 
B. Redacting Names To Actively Shield the Identity of Misbehaving 
Prosecutors 
Even more troubling than simply omitting the names of prosecutors 
who have committed misconduct are some judges’ efforts to delete 
prosecutors’ names from trial transcripts quoted in judicial opinions.  
For instance, in United States v. Sterba, a federal prosecutor made 
representations to the court during trial that later proved to be false.50  
 
appropriate for Banks to assume that his prosecutors would not stoop to improper 
litigation conduct to advance prospects for gaining a conviction.”  Id. at 694. 
 46 See THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, HARMFUL ERROR:  INVESTIGATING 
AMERICA’S LOCAL PROSECUTORS (2003), http://projects.publicintegrity.org/pm/default. 
aspx?sid=sidebarsa &aid =40 (last visited Feb. 9, 2009) [hereinafter CENTER FOR 
PUBLIC INTEGRITY]. 
 47 Id.  The report also tracked many other instances in which courts found 
prosecutorial misconduct but upheld the convictions and sentences because the error 
was harmless.  See id. 
 48 Summary sheets tracking this information are on file with the author. 
 49 The Center for Public Integrity data indicate wide variations in the naming 
practices by state.  In Montana, Vermont, Alaska, and Hawaii, courts reversed a total 
of 54 cases for prosecutorial misconduct, but not a single court in any of those states 
identified the prosecutor by name.  By contrast, Missouri courts reversed 77 cases for 
prosecutorial misconduct and identified the prosecutor by name in 50 of those 
instances; North Carolina courts found 14 cases that merited reversal and named the 
prosecutor in almost all of them.  The Missouri and North Carolina approach is 
certainly the exception and not the rule, however.  The overwhelming majority of 
states named only a fraction of prosecutors when reversing cases for misconduct.  
These figures were determined by compiling information from THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC 
INTEGRITY, HARMFUL ERROR:  INVESTIGATING AMERICA’S LOCAL PROSECUTORS, IN YOUR 
STATE, http://www.publicintegrity.org/pm/states.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2009). 
 50 22 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1334-35 (M.D. Fla. 1998). 
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The trial judge granted a mistrial and issued a ten-page opinion 
quoting the prosecutors’ false statements from the transcript.51  Yet, 
rather than simply excerpt the transcript, the judge redacted the 
prosecutor’s name and replaced it with the initials for Assistant United 
States Attorney (“AUSA”) nearly forty times.52 
Judge Kozinski took the very same approach in his Kojayan opinion 
castigating a federal prosecutor for deceiving the court about a key 
witness’s cooperation agreement.53  In the original opinion, Judge 
Kozinski quoted from the trial transcript to highlight an inappropriate 
objection made by the prosecutor — Jeffrey S. Sinek — that served 
only to interrupt the defense lawyer’s summation.54  In the final 
version of the opinion published in the Federal Reporter, Judge 
Kozinski replaced Sinek’s name with “AUSA.”55  Even more 
remarkably, when Judge Kozinski quoted from the transcript of the 
Ninth Circuit oral argument, in which Sinek continued to represent 
the United States, Kozinkski redacted the oral argument transcript to 
replace two references to Sinek’s name with AUSA.56 
Even the Supreme Court of the United States has redacted 
prosecutors’ names from trial transcripts while simultaneously 
criticizing their conduct.  In a prominent case in which prosecutors 
were accused of using peremptory challenges to eliminate ten of 
eleven black prospective jurors based on race, the Court strongly 
suggested that prosecutors had violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.57  Evidence showed that the prosecutors 
asked different voir dire questions depending on the race of the 
prospective jurors.58  The Court appeared impressed by this evidence 
and quoted the transcript in its opinion.  Yet instead of simply 
excerpting the full transcript, the Court eliminated the prosecutors’ 
names and replaced them with “[Prosecutor].”59 
 
 51 Id.  
 52 Id. at 1334-38. 
 53 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
 54 See United States v. Kojayan, No. 91-50875, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 19873, at 
*19 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 1993). 
 55 See United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315 passim (9th Cir. 1993). 
 56 Compare id. passim (prosecutor’s name excluded), with Kojayan, 1993 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 19873, at *16 (prosecutor’s name included). 
 57 See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 323-25 (2003). 
 58 Id. at 332-33. 
 59 Id. at 333.  In a subsequent review of the same conviction, the Court did cite the 
prosecutor’s name.  See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 256 (2005). 
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C. Failure to Identify Repeat Offenders Because Each Judge Thinks This 
is the Prosecutor’s First Offense 
As Part II.C of this Article discusses, there are a variety of reasons 
why judges might decline to name misbehaving prosecutors.  One 
primary reason may be a judge’s belief that this is the prosecutor’s first 
act of misconduct and that reversing the prosecutor’s hard-won 
conviction is penalty enough to deter the prosecutor from committing 
misconduct in the future.60  Put simply, the judge might be acting out 
of compassion because of a belief that the prosecutor was simply 
misguided in this particular case and does not deserve a public 
shaming that will harm her reputation.61 
This act of compassion might be legitimate if the attorney is guilty 
of nothing more than an accidental first offense.  But what if the 
prosecutor is a serial offender who has repeatedly escaped discipline 
for prior misconduct?  What is to say courts have not already given 
the prosecutor two, three, or even more free passes?   
The example of former federal prosecutor Karen Schmid Cox is 
illustrative.62  In the late 1990s, Cox handled a case, United States v. 
Sterba,63 where the defendant was charged with soliciting sex with a 
minor over the Internet.  At Sterba’s trial, Cox identified a key witness 
to the court, jury, and defense counsel as Gracie Geggs.64  Yet this was 
not the witness’s true name, which Cox knew was Adria Jackson.65  
Because of this deception, the defense was unable to discover the 
witness’s criminal record or her past activities as an informant.66  
When this deception came to light toward the end of trial, the judge 
ordered a mistrial, took the highly unusual step of barring a second 
prosecution, and reported the misconduct to the state bar.67  Although 
the federal judge described Cox’s conduct as “patent[ly] 
disingenuous,” he spared her any published shaming.68  Moreover, in 
 
 60 However, some scholars contend that reversing a conviction is no deterrent to 
the prosecutor whatsoever.  See Walter W. Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and 
Inadequate Discipline, 38 SW. L.J. 965, 976 (1984). 
 61 For discussion on the importance of signaling in setting and determining 
lawyers’ reputations, see Fred C. Zacharias, Effects of Reputation on the Legal Profession, 
65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173, 192-94 (2008). 
 62 See Tarlow, supra note 10, at 58 (describing Cox’s saga as “fiasco”). 
 63 22 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (M.D. Fla. 1998). 
 64 Id. at 1335.  
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 1339. 
 67 Id. at 1343. 
 68 Id. at 1338. 
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quoting from the official transcript, the judge redacted Cox’s name 
and replaced it with “AUSA” at least three dozen times.69 
Less than a year later, Cox’s conduct was the subject of another 
prosecutorial misconduct decision.70  In Ruiz v. State, the Florida 
Supreme Court found that Cox engaged in “egregious misconduct” by 
repeatedly making improper arguments such as suggesting that jurors 
were duty bound to sentence the defendant to death and implying that 
the defendant had to be guilty because innocent people are not put on 
trial.71 
Although Ruiz was argued to the Florida Supreme Court well after 
the federal decision in Sterba, the Ruiz opinion makes no reference to 
Cox’s past misconduct.  We can infer that the Florida Supreme Court 
had no idea the district court had chastised her less than a year earlier 
for prosecutorial misconduct.  Unlike the Sterba court, however, the 
Florida Supreme Court did not redact Cox’s name from the trial 
transcript and it referred to her by name repeatedly throughout its 
opinion.72 
A few years later, Cox was again publicly castigated by the Florida 
Supreme Court for prosecutorial misconduct.73  Acting on a petition 
from the Bar, the Florida Supreme Court ordered that Cox be 
suspended for one year and that she demonstrate rehabilitation before 
being reinstated.74  Shortly thereafter, Cox resigned from the United 
States Attorney’s Office, approximately three years after the district 
 
 69 Id. at 1334-38. 
 70 Cox was a career prosecutor in the Hillsboro County State Attorney’s Office 
before joining the United States Attorney’s Office.  Tarlow, supra note 10, at 58. 
 71 743 So. 2d 1, 4, 5, 7 (Fla. 1999). 
 72 See id. at 5-10. 
 73 In Rogers v. State, 783 So. 2d 980 (Fla. 2001), decided almost exactly two years 
after the Ruiz decision, the Florida Supreme Court again found that Cox had 
committed misconduct, this time by ordering the warrantless search of a defendant’s 
jail cell in order to obtain evidence for an upcoming trial and by making the same type 
of improper closing argument that she gave in the Ruiz case.  See Rogers, 783 So. 2d at 
991-92, 1002 (“[T]he conduct of the prosecutors of the Hillsborough County State 
Attorney’s Office who ordered investigators of that office to engage in a search of 
Rogers’ cell and seize his personal papers was clearly improper.”).  Although the court 
ultimately found that these errors were not sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal 
of the defendant’s conviction, the court did mention Cox by name twice and 
specifically stated that she had committed prosecutorial misconduct in the Ruiz case 
two years earlier.  Id. at 991, 1002 n.6 (“Assistant State Attorney Karen Cox was the 
lead prosecutor in this case and the prosecutor who presented the improper 
‘Operation Desert Storm’ closing argument in Ruiz v. State.”). 
 74 Florida Bar v. Cox, 794 So. 2d 1278, 1287 (Fla. 2001). 
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court issued its decision in Sterba.75  One wonders whether her 
departure might have occurred faster had she initially been identified 
in the decision and had her name, rather than “AUSA,” appeared 
unflatteringly in print dozens of times. 
Prosecutor Cox’s story is not an isolated incident.  Consider also the 
saga of California prosecutor Rosalie Morton, who the California 
Supreme Court identified by name for prosecutorial misconduct in the 
death-penalty case of People v. Hill.76  After a decade of appeals, the 
California Supreme Court reversed Hill’s conviction partly77 because 
Morton had mischaracterized evidence, referred to facts not in 
evidence, and misstated the law.78   
The California Supreme Court repeatedly identified Morton by 
name79 and criticized her misconduct.80  More interestingly, the court 
noted that Morton’s conduct had been criticized in at least three prior 
cases, though she was only named in one of the judicial decisions, and 
even that decision was unpublished: 
We take judicial notice of a 1987 unpublished opinion of the 
Court of Appeal . . . affirming a conviction of Roderick 
Congious, which not only cites Deputy District Attorney 
Rosalie Morton for prosecutorial misconduct, but identifies 
her as the offending prosecutor in two other[], published 
appellate decisions in which the Court of Appeal found 
prosecutorial misconduct without identifying the prosecutor.81 
Although the appellate court issued its unpublished opinion citing 
Morton by name while pre-trial proceedings in Hill were ongoing, the 
 
 75 Tarlow, supra note 10, at 63. 
 76 952 P.2d 673, 679 (Cal. 1998).  The Morton saga is discussed in Speigelman, 
supra note 8, at 121-28.  Interestingly, although Professor Speigelman is very critical 
of “the prosecutor’s practice of misconduct,” he does not identify her by name in his 
law review article.  Id. at 121. 
 77 Hill, 952 P.2d at 698-99 (“Morton’s misconduct, considered in the aggregate, 
may very well be sufficient of itself to require reversal of both the guilt and penalty 
judgments.  We need not reach that question, however, for other errors, as previously 
discussed, occurred in this case.”). 
 78 Id. at 684-94. 
 79 Speigelman, supra note 8, at 170 (noting that California Supreme Court named 
her more than 120 times). 
 80 Unlike many other courts, the California Supreme Court is more prone to 
naming prosecutors who have committed misconduct.  See McKee, supra note 21 
(“Unlike the appellate courts, though, the California Supreme Court typically names 
prosecutors who’ve done wrong or been accused of it.”). 
 81 Hill, 952 P.2d at 699-700 (citations omitted). 
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trial judge in that case was likely unaware of it.82  And the judge 
certainly could not have been aware of the two prior decisions 
criticizing Morton’s conduct but not identifying her by name.  Indeed, 
it appears that the California Supreme Court only became aware of 
Morton’s prior misconduct because Hill’s appellate lawyers dug up the 
information and asked the court to take judicial notice of it.83   
One might wonder whether the trial judge or prosecutor’s office 
might have barred Morton from Hill’s trial in 1988 had the California 
Appellate Court published its opinion in 1987.  And, in turn, one can 
wonder whether the misconduct that led to the 1987 opinion rebuking 
Morton might not have occurred if the earlier two appellate courts that 
criticized her conduct had identified her by name.  Indeed, after the 
stinging rebuke of Morton by the California Supreme Court, she 
resigned her position as a prosecutor84 and has not been noted for any 
further misconduct.85 
The Cox and Morton incidents demonstrate how the same 
prosecutor can engage in flagrant and repeated misconduct.  These 
tales also demonstrate how misbehaving prosecutors may relinquish 
their positions if courts sufficiently chastise them by name.  Cox and 
Morton are not alone in receiving a free pass for the first instance of 
misconduct only to be named in a subsequent judicial opinion for 
misbehavior.86  And they are certainly not the only prosecutors who 
have resigned their positions following a public shaming.87 
 
 82 See Speigelman, supra note 8, at 124. 
 83 See Hill, 952 P.2d at 690 n.4 (noting “defendant’s request for judicial notice”). 
 84 Mike Zapler, State Bar Ignores Errant Lawyers:  Prosecutors, Defense Rarely 
Disciplined, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 12, 2006, at 1A. 
 85 Although the California Supreme Court referred Morton to the State Bar for 
investigation, Hill, 952 P.2d. at 703 n.13, the Bar took no action against her.  McKee, 
supra note 21. 
 86 See, e.g., United States v. Singleterry, 646 F.2d 1014, 1019-20 (5th Cir. Unit A 
June 1981) (naming AUSA Robert Berg for misconduct and indicating that he had not 
been named in recent prior instance of misconduct, United States v. Garza, 608 F.2d 
659 (5th Cir. 1979)). 
 87 For instance, consider how two Department of Justice lawyers resigned after 
being named and sharply criticized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit following their aggressive attempt to convict John Demjanjuk as the infamous 
Nazi concentration camp guard “Ivan the Terrible.”  See Demanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 
F.3d 338, 339-40 (6th Cir. 1993); Morton, supra note 29, at 1083.  Indeed, the 
resignations are all the more noteworthy considering that the Justice Department 
disciplined neither lawyer.  See Dan Christensen, Was Counsel Guilty of Fraud?:  
Demjanjuk Case Now Haunts Former Prosecutor, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 24, 1994, at 2.  The 
lead prosecutor maintains that “he has been ‘unfairly harmed by the panel’s opinion’ 
and committed no fraud.”  Id.   
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II. FAILURE TO NAME THE PROSECUTOR IN CAPITAL REVERSALS 
The cases discussed in Part I are troubling, particularly given that a 
number of them carried the ultimate sanction of death.88  While judges 
might be reluctant to publicly tarnish a prosecutor’s career over a case 
involving a relatively minor crime,89 it is difficult to see why judges 
would have such reluctance in death-penalty cases.  To investigate 
this, I surveyed successful claims involving two major types of 
prosecutorial misconduct — failure to turn over favorable evidence to 
defendants (so-called Brady violations) and the striking of prospective 
jurors based on race (so-called Batson violations) in death-penalty 
cases between 1997 and 2007.  The results demonstrate that while 
courts seem more willing to name the perpetrators of misconduct in 
capital cases, more than 50% of courts were still unwilling to name 
misbehaving prosecutors. 
A. Failure to Name Prosecutors When Finding Brady Violations in 
Capital Cases 
Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v. Maryland, 
prosecutors are required to turn over evidence that is favorable — 
exculpatory or serves impeachment purposes — and that is material 
either to guilt or punishment, regardless of whether the prosecutor 
acts in good faith or bad faith in not turning over the evidence.90  If the 
evidence is favorable to the defendant but not material — meaning 
that there is no reasonable probability that it would have changed the 
outcome — then a prosecutor’s failure to disclose the evidence will 
not lead to reversal91 of the conviction or sentence.92 
 
 88 The Supreme Court’s decision in Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668 (2004), was a death-
penalty case, as was the Ruiz case prosecuted by Karen Cox and the Hill case prosecuted by 
Rosalie Morton.  See supra notes 42-45, 71-72, 76-83 and accompanying text. 
 89 Of course, any incarceration would not seem minor to the defendant — the 
victim of prosecutorial misconduct. 
 90 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 91 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985) (“The evidence is material 
only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the 
defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.  A ‘reasonable 
probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”). 
 92 My study is limited to actual Brady violations, as opposed to what some 
scholars have termed “Brady-type misconduct.”  Under the Brady doctrine, courts will 
not reverse a conviction unless the withheld evidence would have created a reasonable 
probability that the outcome would have been different.  Codes of ethics go further, 
however, and can require a prosecutor to turn over evidence beyond what is covered 
by the Brady doctrine.  Failure to comply with these ethics rules amounts to Brady-
type misconduct.  See Meares, supra note 2, at 909; Rosen, supra note 11, at 696. 
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Brady claims are one of the most common claims brought by 
prisoners,93 including those on death row.94  In fact, of the different 
types of prosecutorial misconduct, Brady claims are the most common 
violation found by courts.95  Nevertheless, in the grand scheme of 
things, Brady claims are rarely granted.96  A study of prosecutorial 
misconduct by the Chicago Tribune reviewed 11,000 homicide cases 
between 1963 and 1999 in which there were allegations that the 
prosecutor concealed exculpatory evidence or presented false 
information.  It found that only 381 convictions were thrown out 
during that thirty-six-year period.97  Of those, sixty-seven led to death 
sentences.98  The authors of the study were convinced that the 
reversals accounted for “only a fraction of how often prosecutors 
commit such deception — which is by design hidden and can take 
extraordinary efforts to uncover.”99 
Undertaking a smaller project, I endeavored to find out what has 
happened when courts reversed capital convictions or death sentences 
for Brady violations.  Between 1997 and 2007, federal and state courts 
reviewed more than 250 Brady claims in capital cases but found 
reversible error in only twenty-six cases.100  Given such serious 
situations, one might expect judicial opinions to name the prosecutors 
 
 93 See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Wishing Petitioners to Death:  Factual Misrepresentations 
in Capital Cases in the Fourth Circuit, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1105, 1132 (2006) (“Because 
it is unclear whether a free-standing claim of innocence is cognizable on habeas 
corpus, the most common vehicle for asserting an innocence claim in federal habeas 
corpus is a Brady claim.”); see also Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error, and 
Federal Wrongful Conviction Law, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 35, 54 (stating that Brady claims 
are most common fair trial claim brought in wrongful conviction cases). 
 94 Johnson, supra note 93, at 1108 n.5 (“The three most common species of claims 
in capital cases are ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Batson claims, and Brady 
claims.”). 
 95 DAVIS, supra note 1, at 131 (“Brady violations are among the most common 
forms of prosecutorial misconduct.”). 
 96 See Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late:  Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, the Duty 
to Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1097, 
1141 (2004) (“[W]hile claims of governmental failure to turn over Brady material are 
common, one study found only 270 federal and state court cases in the last forty years 
that had resulted in reversal of conviction or a new hearing due to withheld Brady 
material.”); see also Scott E. Sundby, Fallen Superheroes and Constitutional Mirages:  
The Tale of Brady v. Maryland, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 643, 644 (2002) (arguing that 
Brady right is mirage and that ethical prosecutors can comply with doctrine without 
affording pretrial discovery). 
 97 See Armstrong & Possley, supra note 12. 
 98 See id.  
 99 Id. 
 100 See infra notes 101-02. 
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in all cases.  Yet, courts named the prosecutors in only eleven cases.101  
In the other fifteen cases, the courts issued lengthy opinions, but 
nowhere mentioned the names of the prosecutors whose misconduct 
was responsible for the reversal of the most serious prosecutions in the 
American justice system.102 
It is worth briefly highlighting some of the egregious misconduct in 
which courts spared prosecutors public shaming by hiding their 
names.  In 2001, the Florida Supreme Court reversed a conviction and 
death sentence after it came to light that the prosecutors failed to turn 
over (1) a report indicating that hair found on the victim did not 
match the defendant and (2) evidence that another individual had 
confessed to the murder.103  Although the court explained that the 
prosecutor’s errors “severely compromised [the defendant’s] right to a 
fair trial,” it nonetheless never named the prosecutor in its opinion.104   
A recent decision from Maryland’s highest court reversed a death 
sentence because prosecutors failed to inform the defendant that the 
star trial witness had requested favorable treatment and refused to sign 
a written statement absent such treatment.105  Thereafter, prosecutors 
allowed the witness to evasively testify that he had not asked 
particular officers for any promises or favors in exchange for the 
 
 101 Appellate courts named the prosecutors in the following cases reversed for 
Brady violations:  Nuckols v. Gibson, 233 F.3d 1261, 1262 (10th Cir. 2000); Avila v. 
Quaterman, 499 F. Supp. 2d 713, 742 (W.D. Tex. 2007); Tassin v. Cain, 482 F. Supp. 
2d 764, 768 (E.D. La. 2007); Bell v. Haley, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1282 (M.D. Ala. 
2005); United States v. Hammer, 404 F. Supp. 2d 676, 682 (M.D. Pa. 2005); Miller v. 
Johnson, H-99-0405, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28941, at *28 n.7 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 
2004); Kelley v. Singletary, 222 F. Supp. 2d 1357, 1363 (S.D. Fla. 2002); Jamison v. 
Collins, 100 F. Supp. 2d 647, 666 (S.D. Ohio 2000); Ware v. State, 702 A.2d 699, 705 
(Md. 1997); Riddle v. Ozmint, 631 S.E.2d 70, 73 (S.C. 2006); Tillman v. State, 128 
P.3d 1123, 1135 n.11 (Utah 2005). 
 102 Appellate courts reversed convictions or death sentences for Brady violations 
but failed to name the prosecutors in the following cases:  Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 
668 (2004); Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036 (10th Cir. 2001); East v. Johnson, 123 
F.3d 235 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Brown, 952 P.2d 715 (Cal. 1998); In re Stacy, No. 
B143115, 2002 WL 1473126 (Cal. Ct. App. July 10, 2002); Hoffman v. State, 800 So. 
2d 174 (Fla. 2001); Young v. State, 739 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 1999); Schofield v. Palmer, 
621 S.E.2d 726 (Ga. 2005); Head v. Stripling, 590 S.E.2d 122 (Ga. 2003); State v. 
Williams, 896 A.2d 973 (Md. 2006); Conyers v. State, 790 A.2d 15 (Md. 2002); State 
v. Bennett, 81 P.3d 1 (Nev. 2003); State v. Nelson, 715 A.2d 281 (N.J. 1998); McCarty 
v. State, 114 P.3d 1089 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005); Ex parte Richardson, 70 S.W.3d 865 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002).  
 103 See Hoffman, 800 So. 2d at 179, 181. 
 104 Id. at 182. 
 105 See Conyers, 790 A.2d at 37. 
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information he provided.106  The court castigated the prosecutors for 
this conduct, explaining that “the State was an active participant in the 
‘smoke and mirrors’ effort to mislead the Petitioner and jury as to the 
full circumstances preceding and precipitating [the witness’s] plea 
agreement.”107  Yet, the court still failed to name the prosecutor even 
once in its twenty-eight page opinion. 
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals recently reversed a capital 
conviction and death sentence following allegations that a police 
chemist had altered lab tests and that prosecutors had failed to 
disclose impeachment evidence demonstrating that the chemist’s work 
was not peer reviewed and that she had not completed her yearly 
proficiency tests.108  The court identified the chemist by name more 
than fifty times, but it never named the prosecutors involved.  Instead, 
the court referred to them dozens of times as the “State” or the 
“prosecutors,” even where, as a linguistic matter, it would have made 
far more sense to identify them by name.109  Ironically, the court 
contended that prosecutors and defense lawyers should have been “on 
notice” of the chemist’s misconduct because prior court decisions had 
singled her out by name for inappropriate behavior.110  It apparently 
did not occur to the court that future judges and defense attorneys 
would not receive similar notice regarding the identities of the 
prosecutors who allowed the chemist to continue her misconduct and 
who failed to turn over evidence required by the Brady doctrine. 
Although the prosecutors’ misconduct is clear cut in the 
abovementioned cases, skeptics might argue that judges failed to name 
prosecutors in other cases because it was unclear that they were at 
fault.  Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Kyles v. Whitley, 
the obligation to disclose favorable evidence extends beyond the 
prosecutor to “any favorable evidence known to the others acting on 
the government’s behalf.”111  Thus, the Brady doctrine requires 
reversal even if fault lies with police officers or other key state 
 
 106 See id. at 41. 
 107 Id. 
 108 See McCarty v. State, 114 P.3d 1089, 1091 (Okla. Crim. App. 2005). 
 109 See, e.g., id. at 1093 (“We recognize the parties sharply disagree about the 
State’s complicity in (or conscious disregard of) Ms. Gilchrist’s actions. Petitioner’s 
attorneys are adamant that the State should have known or were on notice regarding 
deficiencies in Ms. Gilchrist’s opinions and scientific techniques.”).  Given that Ms. 
Gilchrist, a chemist, was part of “the State” for Brady purposes, however, it makes 
little sense to differentiate the prosecutors by referring to them as the State.  See Kyles 
v. Whiley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). 
 110 Id. 
 111 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). 
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employees, and even if the prosecutor was unaware that the 
exculpatory evidence existed.112 
Therefore, we might infer that the reason courts do not name 
prosecutors in some opinions is that it was unclear whether they (as 
opposed to the police) were responsible for the Brady violations.  And 
given that reversal was required regardless of the prosecutor’s 
complicity, there was no reason for the court to wade into the factual 
question of which government employee was at fault.113  Yet, a review 
of the twenty-six Brady reversals in capital cases indicates only one 
case in which the prosecutor was unaware of the favorable evidence.114  
In the remaining cases that fail to name the prosecutors, the clear 
implication of the court opinions is that the prosecutors were 
responsible for the misconduct.115   
Taking the cases from the reverse angle, in the eleven cases where 
the courts did name the prosecutors, they typically did so in a 
sheepish way.  In two of the cases, the courts only named the 
prosecutors by last name.  And these prosecutors had common last 
names — Roberson and Martin.116 
In most of the eight remaining cases, courts mentioned the 
prosecutors’ names only in passing reference and not in the parts of 
the opinion that excoriate the prosecutors for misbehavior.  Indeed, 
given that most Brady claims are brought as habeas corpus petitions, 
which produce lengthy opinions, even when the prosecutor is 
identified, the name is lost in the morass of the opinion.  For instance, 
 
 112 See id. 
 113 I am grateful to Professor Brandon Garrett for making this point to me. 
 114 See In re Brown, 952 P.2d 715, 719-21 (Cal. 1998) (reversing conviction and 
death sentence because crime lab failed to disclose favorable lab tests). 
 115 See, e.g., Conyers v. State, 790 A.2d 15, 41 (Md. 2002) (“Finally, the State was 
an active participant in the ‘smoke and mirrors’ effort to mislead the Petitioner and 
jury as to the full circumstances preceding and precipitating Johnson’s plea 
agreement. . . . In closing argument at trial, the prosecutor trumpeted Johnson’s 
version of why he contacted police . . . .”).  
 116 Nuckols v. Gibson, 233 F.3d 1261, 1266 (10th Cir. 2000) (identifying “District 
Attorney Roberson”); United States v. Hammer, 404 F. Supp. 2d 676, 679-82 (M.D. 
Pa. 2005) (identifying prosecutor as “Mr. Martin”).  By contrast, in one of these 
decisions the court went to the trouble of conspicuously and fully identifying the 
names of the defense attorneys in the very beginning of the opinion.  Hammer, 404 F. 
Supp. 2d at 681 (stating in fourth paragraph of 126-page opinion that “Mr. Hammer 
was represented by David A. Ruhnke, Esquire, and Ronald C. Travis, Esquire, two 
highly experienced criminal defense attorneys”).  The court also went to the trouble of 
specifically identifying the full names of the lawyers appointed for post-conviction 
proceedings.  Id. at 687 (“By order of December 21, 2000, we appointed Monica 
Foster, Esquire, and Rhonda Long-Sharp, Esquire, to represent Mr. Hammer with 
respect to any post-conviction proceedings.”). 
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in a Utah Supreme Court decision reversing a death sentence for 
failure to turn over transcripts from pre- and post-polygraph 
interviews of the key witness, the court issued a twenty-four-page 
decision that listed the prosecutor’s name only once, buried in the 
middle of a footnote.117  And even then the prosecutor was only named 
in a sentence discussing how the key witness had made a 
contradictory statement during an interview with the prosecutor.118  
Thus, it is unclear whether the prosecutor listed in the footnote is the 
one at fault for failing to turn over the transcripts.119 
In sum, courts named the prosecutor in only thirty-five percent of 
the capital cases reversed for Brady violations from 1997 through 
2007.  Numerous courts failed to name prosecutors in egregious cases 
of misconduct, and when they did name offenders, they often did so 
only in passing rather than highlighting the offenders to shame them 
for their misconduct. 
B. Failure to Name Prosecutors When Finding Batson Violations in 
Capital Cases 
For decades, the Supreme Court has forbidden racial discrimination 
in selecting jurors, but it long embraced a test that made it nearly 
impossible for defendants to prove such discrimination.120  
Prosecutors could use their peremptory strikes to eliminate black 
prospective jurors and the defendant had no recourse unless he could 
show a pattern of such misconduct in other cases besides his own.121  
 
 117 Tillman v. State, 128 P.3d 1123, 1135 n.11 (Utah 2005); see also Tassin v. Cain, 
482 F. Supp. 2d 764, 768 (E.D. La. 2007) (mentioning prosecutor’s name only twice 
in 11-page opinion and doing so in way that made it unclear whether named 
prosecutor was one who handled case); Miller v. Johnson, No. H-99-0405, 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 28941, at *28 n.7 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2004) (listing prosecutor’s name 
only once and placing it in footnote in decision that was dozens of pages long). 
 118 See Tillman, 128 P.3d at 1135 n.11 (“Specifically, in an interview with 
prosecutor Mike Christensen, [the key witness] expressly denied that [the defendant] 
had ever hit her or threatened her or her family with injury . . . .”). 
 119 By contrast, in only one of the 26 capital cases reversed for Brady misconduct 
did the court identify the prosecutors enough times to truly shame them.  See Bell v. 
Haley, 437 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1282 (M.D. Ala. 2005) (stating early in opinion that 
“[t]he prosecutors on the case were Janice Clardy and William R. Hill, Jr.” and 
proceeding to name each of them dozens of times). 
 120 See Pamela S. Karlan, Batson v. Kentucky:  The Constitutional Challenges of 
Peremptory Challenges, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 382, 408 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 
2006) (describing Supreme Court’s jurisprudence as toothless). 
 121 See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227 (1965) (forbidding racial discrimination 
in jury selection but seeming to require that defendants demonstrate repeated striking of 
black jurors in numerous cases besides defendants’ individual cases). 
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In its 1986 decision in Batson v. Kentucky, the Court loosened the 
standard for demonstrating racial discrimination in the use of 
peremptory challenges by allowing defendants to focus exclusively on 
the voir dire in their own case.122  The Batson decision created a 
burden-shifting standard in which the petitioner must demonstrate a 
prima facie case of discrimination, and the State must rebut that 
showing with race-neutral reasons for its peremptory strikes.123 
While Batson may be an improvement on the Court’s earlier 
jurisprudence, successfully demonstrating a Batson violation is no easy 
task.124  Unlike almost all other areas of criminal procedure, Batson 
challenges involve an inquiry into the subjective state of mind of the 
prosecutor.125  To a large extent, that subjective state of mind is 
unknowable and there is a great risk that prosecutors will shade their 
true reasons or, worse yet, lie outright to prevent the court from 
finding a Batson violation.126  And well-meaning prosecutors may very 
well lie because they believe Batson violations amount to nothing more 
than a windfall for guilty defendants127 or a strategic ploy by defense 
lawyers to keep a prodefense juror from being struck from the jury.128  
Put simply, when courts strike down death sentences for Batson 
violations, there has been a serious constitutional violation. 
Between 1997 and 2007, courts reversed or strongly suggested that 
reversal was appropriate on remand in fifteen129 death penalty cases 
 
 122 476 U.S. 79, 80 (1986). 
 123 See id. at 96-98. 
 124 See, e.g., Joshua E. Swift, Note, Batson’s Invidious Legacy:  Discriminatory Juror 
Exclusion and the “Intuitive” Peremptory Challenge, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 336, 357-58 
(1993) (studying 76 Batson challenges and finding that federal courts rejected 
prosecutors’ race-neutral reasons in only three of them).  Indeed, as Professor Karlan 
has explained, once a trial judge has rejected a Batson challenge, “defendants find it 
well-nigh impossible to overturn a trial court’s finding that no Batson violation 
occurred.”  Karlan, supra note 120, at 408. 
 125 See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 378 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(arguing that requiring proof of subjective intent of prosecutor in Batson challenges 
imposes “added requirement” not normally required in other contexts). 
 126 See Henning, supra note 8, at 792 (“Judicial inquiry into prosecutorial motives 
invites responses that may not always be candid, and indeed sometimes will be an 
outright lie.”). 
 127 See id. at 791. 
 128 See Jean Montoya, The Future of the Post-Batson Peremptory Challenge:  Voir Dire 
by Questionnaire and the Blind Peremptory, 29 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 981, 1008 (1996) 
(“Some prosecutors also commented that defense counsel sometimes used the 
[Batson] motions strategically to embarrass the prosecutor or to prevent the loss of a 
juror biased in the defendant’s favor.”). 
 129 This number is seemingly low.  However, it is explainable by (1) the difficulty 
of proving a Batson violation, and (2) the fact that Batson violations can be 
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due to Batson violations.130  Courts identified the prosecutors in less 
than half of those cases.131  Moreover, as with Brady violations, some 
of the names were buried in long opinions and would only be noticed 
by someone looking carefully for them. 
For example, in 2006 the Missouri Supreme Court reversed a capital 
conviction and death sentence because prosecutors had used 
peremptory challenges to strike five of the six black prospective jurors 
on the venire.132  The court found that it was “obvious” that the 
prosecutor’s race-neutral reasons “were merely a pretext for the State’s 
exercise of its peremptory strikes for racially discriminatory 
reasons.”133  Yet the only reference to the prosecutor’s name is in a 
quote from the voir dire transcript, and even then the court only used 
a surname and did so in a way in which it was not clear whether the 
individual was the prosecutor or defense lawyer.134 
Similarly, an Alabama court reversed a death-penalty case because a 
prosecutor could not demonstrate race-neutral reasons for using 
twelve of his fifteen peremptory challenges to strike black prospective 
 
procedurally defaulted if defense lawyers do not properly preserve the record.  On the 
second point, see, for example, Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 713-18 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(finding Batson violation after rejecting vigorous argument by government that 
Holloway had procedurally defaulted claim). 
 130 In 13 of the cases, appellate courts clearly reversed death-penalty cases for 
Batson violations.  See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 235 (2005); Holloway, 355 
F.3d at 710-11; Bui v. Haley, 321 F.3d 1304, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003); Riley v. Taylor, 
277 F.3d 261, 273 (3d Cir. 2001); Hardcastle v. Horn, 521 F. Supp. 2d 388, 423 (E.D. 
Pa. 2007); Lark v. Beard, 495 F. Supp. 2d 488, 503 (E.D. Pa. 2007); Yancey v. State, 
813 So. 2d 1, 2 (Ala. Crim. App. 2001); People v. Silva, 21 P.3d 769, 798 (Cal. 2001); 
State v. Coleman, 970 So. 2d 511, 516-17 (La. 2007); State v. Harris, 820 So. 2d 471, 
477 (La. 2002); Flowers v. State, 947 So. 2d 910, 939 (Miss. 2007); State v. 
McFadden, 216 S.W.3d 673, 674 (Mo. 2007); State v. McFadden, 191 S.W.3d 648, 
650 (Mo. 2006).  In the fourteenth case, the appellate court found a Batson violation 
but remanded the case rather than reversing the conviction because the record was 
incomplete.  See Mahaffey v. Page, 162 F.3d 481, 486 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding Batson 
violation but explaining that “[b]ecause the [lower] court never required the State to 
[come forward with race-neutral explanations] . . . [w]e therefore REVERSE the 
judgment of the district court and order that the writ be granted unless, within 120 
days, the state trial court holds a new hearing”).  Finally, in the last case, the Supreme 
Court issued a certificate of appealability based on the Batson claim but remanded for 
further proceedings.  See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 348 (2003). 
 131 Dretke, 545 U.S. at 236; Bui, 321 F.3d at 1308; Riley, 277 F.3d at 271; 
Hardcastle, 521 F. Supp. 2d at 394; Lark, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 493; Yancey, 813 So. 2d at 
3; McFadden, 191 S.W.3d at 658. 
 132 McFadden, 191 S.W.3d at 657. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. (including questions to prospective juror from “Mr. Bishop”).  It is not 
apparent, though one can assume, that Mr. Bishop was the prosecutor.   
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jurors.135  The prosecutor tried to explain away one of the strikes by 
pointing to a black prospective juror’s traffic tickets.  The court was 
unconvinced by this explanation because the prosecutor failed to 
strike similar white prospective jurors, including one white juror who 
had twelve traffic offenses, two misdemeanors, and one felony 
charge.136  To the court’s credit, it did not redact the prosecutor’s name 
when quoting from the voir dire transcript.  Yet it only mentioned his 
name a handful of times and only listed him as Mr. Davis, rather than 
using his full name.137 
Thus, while these two courts did technically identify the prosecutors 
by name, they did so only by leaving a handful of references to their last 
names in the quoted court transcripts.  When these courts actually took 
pen to paper to use their own words to describe these prosecutors’ 
actions, the courts used the words “prosecutor” or “State” over and over 
again, rather than identifying the prosecutors by name.138 
Of course, even cursory and incomplete naming is preferable to no 
naming at all.  As noted above, more than half of the courts finding 
Batson violations failed to name the offending prosecutor in the 
opinions.139  And the failure to name was not for lack of opportunity. 
For instance, the Third Circuit recently reversed a death sentence 
after the prosecutor used eleven of his twelve peremptory challenges to 
strike black prospective jurors from the venire.140  The court spent one 
full page of its opinion quoting the stated reasons for the strikes and 
used the phrase “the prosecutor” thirteen times without ever identifying 
him by name.141  The court saw no need to personally chastise the 
prosecutor even though it labeled his conduct as “evasive”142 and said 
that there was “nothing . . . to indicate that he harbored anything but a 
 
 135 Yancey, 813 So. 2d at 2. 
 136 Id. at 5. 
 137 Id. at 3, 5, 6. 
 138 E.g., id. at 8 (“Here, the prosecution used its first four strikes to remove black 
prospective jurors . . . . The State used 12 of its 15 strikes to remove black 
veniremembers. . . . Thus, the voir dire provides no support for some of the reasons 
advanced by the prosecution.  From the record it appears that the prosecutor engaged in 
disparate treatment when striking Yancey’s jury.”) (emphasis added). 
 139 Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328 (2003); Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 
707, 712 (3d Cir. 2004); Mahaffey v. Page, 162 F.3d 481, 486 (7th Cir. 1998); People 
v. Silva, 21 P.3d 769, 790-96 (Cal. 2001); State v. Coleman, 970 So. 2d 511, 513 (La. 
2007); State v. Harris, 820 So. 2d 471, 474-77 (La. 2002); Flowers v. State, 947 So. 2d 
910, 916 (Miss. 2007); State v. McFadden, 216 S.W.3d 673, 674-75 (Mo. 2007). 
 140 Holloway, 355 F.3d at 712, 730. 
 141 Id. at 721. 
 142 Id. at 729. 
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discriminatory intent to remove [a particular] juror because of his 
race.”143  Moreover, on the very next page, the court had no reluctance 
in stating the full name of the defendant’s lawyer.144   
Finally, nowhere is the failure to name prosecutors more apparent 
than in the Supreme Court’s145 much discussed decision in Miller-El v. 
Cockrell.146  In a decision credited with reinvigorating the Batson 
doctrine,147 the Court addressed a death-penalty case in which 
prosecutors had used their peremptory challenges to strike ten of 
eleven eligible black jurors.148  The Court explained that prosecutors 
asked jurors about their views of the death penalty and varied the 
questions based on race in an apparent effort to exclude black 
jurors.149  To illustrate this, the Court quoted from the record but 
redacted the district attorney’s name from the transcript, replacing it 
with “[Prosecutor].”150 
In sum, a number of courts have reversed capital cases because 
prosecutors engaged in racial discrimination in jury selection.  Yet, 
consistently, these courts do not name the individual prosecutors.  
And when courts have identified prosecutors’ names, they often only 
do so by including a handful of references from voir dire transcripts. 
C. Reasons Judges Are Reluctant to Name Prosecutors 
There are a variety of reasons why judges rarely identify prosecutors 
by name when reversing their cases for misconduct.  As discussed 
below, some of the reasons demonstrate why trial judges fail to name 
 
 143 Id. at 724-25. 
 144 Id. at 722 n.10.  Moreover, the Court did not hesitate to add (albeit interesting) 
details that the lawyer subsequently entered the federal witness protection program 
following convictions for bribery.  See id. 
 145 Although outside the time period of my study, the Supreme Court also failed to 
name the prosecutor in its 2008 decision reversing a capital case because of the 
prosecutor’s “implausibl[e]” race-neutral reasons for striking black prospective jurors.  
See Snyder v. Louisana, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1211 (2008). 
 146 537 U.S. 322 (2003).   
 147 See Mattie Johnstone & Joshua M. Zacharia, Note, Peremptory Challenges and 
Racial Discrimination:  The Effects of Miller-El v. Cockrell, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 863, 
865-66 (2004). 
 148 See Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 331. 
 149 See id. 
 150 Id. at 333.  As noted, the Court issued a certificate of appealability in Miller-El’s 
case and remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit.  See id. at 348.  When the Fifth 
Circuit again refused to find a Batson violation, the Supreme Court again granted 
certiorari.  This time, the Court reversed the conviction and named the prosecutors 
who had conducted the voir dire.  Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 236, 266 (2005). 
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prosecutors while other reasons explain why appellate judges fail to 
name offenders.  Unfortunately, none of these explanations provides 
satisfactory justification for sparing misbehaving prosecutors from 
public naming. 
The first, and most obvious, reason courts may be reluctant to 
identify prosecutors by name is that prosecutors are repeat players in 
the criminal justice system.  This justification applies much more 
strongly at the trial court level than at the appellate level.  At the trial 
level, prosecutors are often assigned to a particular judge’s courtroom 
for an extended period of time.151  This repeated contact may lead to a 
close relationship and bond between the judge and the prosecutor.152  
It therefore makes sense that the trial judges they appear in front of 
day after day would be reluctant to take prosecutors to task publicly.  
However, this logic does not apply as easily to appellate court 
decisions.  Appellate judges typically do not have relationships with 
individual prosecutors.  Indeed, many, though certainly not all, 
district attorneys’ offices have appellate divisions that exclusively 
handle appeals.  Thus, to the extent appellate judges have any repeat 
interaction with prosecutors’ offices, it is often not with the individual 
who committed the misconduct that is the subject of the appeal.   
A second, and more compelling, reason why appellate judges may 
decline to name prosecutors is a desire to protect their own.  Many 
appellate judges were once prosecutors themselves.153  Recalling how 
difficult the job was and with a fondness for their former position, 
appellate judges may be reluctant to stigmatize those with whom they 
can identify. 
Moreover, there is a general instinct among lawyers to protect those 
in the profession.  Disciplinary bodies are reluctant to impose stiff 
sanctions154 and, perhaps more tellingly, many lawyers are reluctant to 
report the misconduct of their peers.  Model Rule of Professional 
Conduct 8.3 requires any attorney to report another attorney’s 
professional misconduct when that misconduct raises a “substantial 
 
 151 See Roberta K. Flowers, An Unholy Alliance:  The Ex Parte Relationship Between 
the Judge and the Prosecutor, 79 NEB. L. REV. 251, 269 (2000) (“[P]rosecutors appear 
daily in front of the same judge.”); Brandon L. Garrett, Aggregation in Criminal Law, 
95 CAL. L. REV. 383, 398 (2007) (explaining that prosecutors are “the ultimate repeat 
players[] since they litigate all criminal cases”). 
 152 See Flowers, supra note 151, at 269 (citing BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 12-13 (1996)). 
 153 See Meares, supra note 2, at 912. 
 154 See Henning, supra note 8, at 829 (“[T]he professional disciplinary system has 
proved inadequate in addressing prosecutorial misconduct.”); Rosen, supra note 11, at 697. 
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question” as to that attorney’s fitness to practice law.155  Not 
surprisingly, compliance with Rule 8.3 is very low.156  A study of 1,000 
Boston attorneys found that only 6.3% of lawyers would report their 
colleagues to the bar were they aware of a flagrant violation of an 
ethical canon, which, if discovered, might result in criminal liability 
for their colleague.157 
The reasons for the poor rate of reporting under Model Rule 8.3 and 
similar provisions include ignorance of the rules, fear of retaliation, 
fear of being labeled a snitch, and the lack of any real sanction for 
violating the rule.158  Scholars have estimated that compliance with 
Model Rule 8.3 would greatly improve if sanctions were more than the 
trifle they currently are.159  In that connection, it is noteworthy that 
judges face no sanction for failing to name prosecutors who have 
committed misconduct. 
A third, and perhaps more obvious, explanation for courts’ failure to 
name prosecutors is simple compassion.  Judges might believe that the 
misconduct is an isolated episode.  The thought process of judges 
might go like this:   
Prosecutor X made a terrible error in failing to turn over 
exculpatory evidence or striking a series of prospective jurors based 
on their race.  But I do not see any evidence that Prosecutor X is a 
consistently unethical person.  This may have been an isolated 
 
 155 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2007). 
 156 See Gerald E. Lynch, The Lawyer as Informer, 1986 DUKE L.J. 491, 538 (noting 
“the disappointing experience of mandatory informing”); Cynthia L. Gendry, 
Comment, Ethics — An Attorney’s Duty to Report the Professional Misconduct of Co-
Workers, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 603, 606 (1994) (“Compliance with the requirement to 
report peer misconduct has been notoriously poor.”); Ryan Williams, Comment, 
Reputation and the Rules:  An Argument for a Balancing Approach Under Rule 8.3 of the 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 68 LA. L. REV. 931, 932 (2008) (“It will come as 
no surprise that lawyers prefer not to report the misconduct of their peers.”). 
 157 See Williams, supra note 156, at 945 (discussing David O. Burbank & Robert S. 
Duboff, Ethics and the Legal Profession:  A Survey of Boston Lawyers, 9 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 66, 99-100 (1974)). 
 158 See Gendry, supra note 156, at 606-07.  Indeed, in some communities, there is 
such hostility to reporting that a “stop snitching” movement has taken root and 
discouraged any type of cooperation with authorities, even to solve crimes.  See 
Richard Delgado, Law Enforcement in Subordinated Communities:  Innovation and 
Response, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1193, 1205 (2008). 
 159 Ronald D. Rotunda, The Lawyer’s Duty to Report Another Lawyer’s Unethical 
Violations in the Wake of Himmel, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 977, 992 (noting that after 
Illinois Supreme Court suspended lawyer for one year for failing to report another 
attorney’s misconduct that “preliminary empirical evidence already suggests that the 
number of cases in which lawyers report other lawyers has gone up”). 
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mistake.  After all, prosecutors have more cases than they can 
handle and it may simply have been an oversight or a momentary 
lapse of judgment.  I just don’t think it was a purposeful act of 
misconduct.  If I call the prosecutor out by name it will harm her 
career, and I do not think that sanction is merited. 
Moreover, compassion for prosecutors (as opposed to the aggrieved 
criminal defendants who suffered the misconduct) might be more 
forthcoming because the prosecutors accused of the misconduct are 
sometimes present in front of the appellate judges to argue the issues 
on appeal.160  It is much easier to speak ill of someone you have never 
met than someone who has appeared before you in court.161 
Fourth, it is possible, though not particularly likely, that appellate 
judges fall victim to the same sort of “softening” that arguably happens 
to prosecutors over the years.  Scholars have posited that as 
prosecutors see more and more violent cases they become jaded.162  
Simple theft does not look as bad when you have just prosecuted three 
violent robberies.  We could posit the same phenomenon with respect 
to appellate judges.  After seeing much inappropriate behavior by 
attorneys, it takes something truly outrageous to upset an appellate 
judge.  This thesis is not compelling.  Unlike prosecutors who deal 
with violent crimes day after day, judges see relatively few cases of 
egregious prosecutorial misconduct.  It is therefore difficult to see how 
appellate judges would become jaded by prosecutors’ misconduct. 
Finally, there is the possibility that lower court judges disagree with 
the rules they are enforcing.  For instance, some judges might disagree 
with the rule that prosecutors cannot comment on the defendant’s 
failure to testify,163 or they may see nothing wrong with striking black 
jurors based on race, so long as the State also strikes white jurors 
 
 160 See, e.g., United States v. Kojayan, No. 91-50875, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 19873, 
at *16 (9th Cir. Aug. 4, 1993) (indicating that prosecutor accused of misconduct, 
whose name court originally included in appellate opinion but later redacted, 
personally argued appeal). 
 161 Indeed, in the Fourth Circuit, the judges have a practice of descending from the 
bench to shake the hands of the advocates following each argument.  See Deborah 
Sontag, The Power of the Fourth, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 9, 2003, at 640. 
 162 See Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 921 (2006). 
 163 See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 336 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(strenuously criticizing this rule more than three decades after Supreme Court 
adopted it and arguing that “it is implausible that the Americans of 1791, who were 
subject to adverse inferences for failing to give unsworn testimony, would have 
viewed an adverse inference for failing to give sworn testimony as a violation of the 
Fifth Amendment”). 
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based on race as well.164  Thus, while judges may feel bound to follow 
precedents they do not like, they would be reluctant to excoriate 
prosecutors by name for disobeying rules with which they disagree.  
This explanation may hold true for a handful of judges.  But by and 
large, it is not convincing.  Because the harmless error test gives 
appellate courts little room to reverse convictions, rarely does 
anything short of flagrant misconduct trigger a reversal.165  Thus, for 
the core types of prosecutorial misconduct, such as withholding 
exculpatory evidence, judges who find enough prejudice to reverse a 
conviction are likely to be offended by the prosecutors’ clear violation 
of the rules. 
In sum, the more convincing explanation for appellate courts’ failure 
to name prosecutors for their misconduct is a combination of 
compassion, self-identification based on prior work as a prosecutor, 
and the general cultural norm against snitching on colleagues.  As 
explained below, however, while these reasons have explanatory 
power, they are not adequate reasons for declining to name 
prosecutors who have committed misconduct. 
III. SHAMING AS AN ALTERNATIVE SANCTION AGAINST PROSECUTORS 
As discussed in Part II, prosecutors are rarely named for their 
misconduct.  Prosecutors therefore escape public shaming for their 
misdeeds.  By contrast, there has been a rise166 in the use of shaming 
punishments against criminal defendants in recent years.167  Such 
 
 164 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 137 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“In 
my view, there is simply nothing ‘unequal’ about the State using its peremptory challenges 
to strike blacks from the jury in cases involving black defendants, so long as such 
challenges are also used to exclude whites in cases involving white defendants . . . .”). 
 165 See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
 166 Brian Netter, Avoiding the Shameful Backlash:  Social Repercussions for the Increased 
Use of Alternative Sanctions, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 187, 189 (2005) (“[S]haming 
penalties [have been] increasing in recent years.”); Ryan J. Huschka, Comment, Sorry for 
the Jackass Sentence:  A Critical Analysis of the Constitutionality of Contemporary Shaming 
Punishments, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 803, 804 (2006) (noting same trend). 
 167 Prominent scholars are mixed on the value of shaming punishments.  Compare 
Dan Markel, Are Shaming Punishments Beautifully Retributive?  Retributivism and the 
Implications for the Alternative Sanctions Debate, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2157 (2001) 
(providing retributivist critique of shaming punishments), and Toni M. Massaro, 
Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1880 (1991) (arguing 
that shaming punishments are not effective within context of American social and 
cultural norms), with Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 591 (1996) [hereinafter, Kahan, Alternative Sanctions] (expressing view 
supporting shaming punishments).  Professor Kahan has recently recanted his support 
for shaming as a viable substitute for incarceration.  See Dan M. Kahan, What’s Really 
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punishments are designed to publicize the defendant’s illegal conduct, 
reinforce that such conduct is contrary to existing social norms, and to 
force the defendant to suffer for that misconduct.168  While there has 
been much attention devoted to shaming criminal defendants, the 
same logic could also be applied to prosecutors who have flouted 
social norms and legal rules.  And while there are certainly objections 
to shaming prosecutors, there is reason to believe such punishments 
can be effective. 
A. Using Publicity to Shame Prosecutors 
The leading scholar on shaming punishments, Professor Dan Kahan, 
has identified four categories of shaming:  publicity, stigmatization, 
self-debasement, and contrition.169  Examples abound for each type of 
shaming.  Some jurisdictions have used the publicity approach by 
placing the names of men who solicit prostitutes in newspapers.170  
Judges have stigmatized offenders by forcing them to wear sign boards 
identifying their crimes.171  Other judges have forced offenders to 
suffer the same type of suffering they inflicted, such as sentencing 
slum lords to house arrest in their own buildings.172  Still other courts 
require offenders to display contrition by publicly apologizing to their 
victims.173 
For present purposes, the publicity approach to shaming is worth 
further discussion.  Some courts have taken what might be called a 
bludgeon approach to publicity shaming by shaming the offender in 
the eyes of society at large.  A number of courts have ordered 
offenders to stand in busy areas wearing signs that announce their 
crimes.174  Other offenders have been forced to advertise their 
misconduct in newspapers or on television.175 
 
Wrong with Shaming Sanctions, 84 TEX. L. REV. 2075, 2075 (2006). 
 168 See Note, Shame, Stigma, and Crime:  Evaluating the Efficacy of Shaming 
Sanctions in Criminal Law, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2186, 2187 (2003). 
 169 Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 167, at 631.  Professor Stephen Garvey 
has added another category for punishments that educate.  Stephen P. Garvey, Can 
Shaming Punishments Educate?, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 794 (1998). 
 170 Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 167, at 632. 
 171 United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 598 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 172 Don Terry, Landlord in His Own Jail, Tenants Debate His Fate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
18, 1988, at B1.  This idea was later featured in a film starring Joe Pesci.  THE SUPER 
(Twentieth Century Fox 1991). 
 173 Garvey, supra note 169, at 791-94. 
 174 Id. at 734 & n.9, 735 (recounting numerous sign punishments). 
 175 Courtney Guyton Persons, Note, Sex in the Sunlight:  The Effectiveness, 
Efficiency, Constitutionality, and Advisability of Publishing Names and Pictures of 
  
1090 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:1059 
While many courts have used the bludgeon approach, some judges 
have recognized that the most powerful audience is not the general 
community but rather the offender’s professional community.  For 
instance, consider how one judge punished a lobbyist convicted of 
illegal campaign contributions by requiring him to compose a 
narrative about his crime and distribute it at his own expense to 2,000 
Washington lobbyists and political action committees.176  The 
underlying logic is that a lobbyist or corporate executive might not 
care what an auto mechanic from across town thinks of him, but he 
does care what his colleagues, customers, and peers think.177  
The same approach could be applied to prosecutors.  Prosecutors 
might not be concerned that the general public approves or 
disapproves of their tactics, but they are likely to care a great deal 
what their peers — judges, (some) defense lawyers, and other 
prosecutors — think about them.  The obvious approach to shaming 
misbehaving prosecutors among their peer group is not to use 
newspapers that reach a general audience but, instead, judicial 
opinions that would be read by judges and other lawyers.  Yet, as we 
have seen, even when judges name prosecutors in judicial decisions, 
the names are often lost in lengthy opinions.178  And if lawyers are 
unlikely to see the names in judicial opinions because they are buried 
in footnotes or otherwise not prominently featured, the shaming will 
not be effective.  We want the name to stand out, like a sandwich 
board walking down the street that says, “I stole mail.”179  As such, 
just as in the lobbyist case discussed above, a more effective approach 
would be to make a list of prosecutors’ names and their misconduct 
and to then mail the list to the prosecutors’ peer groups. 
Shaming, even if it is only a list of prosecutors’ names and a 
description of their actions, could be very effective.180  In a profession 
 
Prostitutes’ Patrons, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1525, 1526-27 (1996). 
 176 Dan M. Kahan, Shaming White Collar Offenders, 12 FED. SENT’G. REP. 51, 53 (1999). 
 177 See id.  Professors Kahan and Eric Posner have proposed institutionalizing 
publicity shaming in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to deal with white collar 
offenders.  See Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals:  A 
Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 385-86 
(1999) (proposing “shaming component [that] . . . would consist of stigmatizing 
publicity in the form of a media announcement, paid for by the defendant, detailing in 
a straightforward fashion ‘the nature of the offense committed, the fact of conviction, 
the nature of the punishment imposed, and the steps that will be taken to prevent the 
recurrence of similar offenses’”). 
 178 See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text. 
 179 See United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596, 598, 601-02 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 180 See James Q. Whitman, What Is Wrong With Inflicting Shame Sanctions?, 107 
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where reputation is the most valuable commodity, identifying 
perpetrators of prosecutorial misconduct will be embarrassing.  
Moreover, it will also carry residual punishment down the road by 
diminishing a lawyer’s chance of later achieving a judgeship or other 
high status public service job.181  Additionally, identifying 
prosecutorial misconduct will highlight cases that might not otherwise 
receive media attention.  This, in turn, will make it more likely that 
bar disciplinary committees will open an inquiry into the incidents 
and possibly discipline the offending lawyers in an official fashion.182 
Finally, shaming prosecutors will signal to other actors in the 
criminal justice system that they should be cautious in dealing with 
these prosecutors.  This has less to do with deterring or even 
punishing misbehaving prosecutors and more to do with protecting 
others around them.  By way of analogy, some judges have ordered the 
use of special license plates for DWI offenders in order to signal to 
other drivers to keep a safe distance.183   
The idea of signaling the need to be wary of certain prosecutors 
actually inverts a common objection to shaming punishments.  Critics 
of shaming argue that such punishments are dehumanizing.184 Rather 
 
YALE L.J. 1055, 1058-59 (1998) (contending that although shame sanctions can work, 
they amount to dangerous interaction between Government and crowds). 
 181 See Williams v. State, 734 P.2d 700, 704 n.6 (Nev. 1987) (“In the past, we have 
been reticent to identify the perpetrators of misconduct by name, primarily out of 
reluctance to do counsel serious lasting professional injury, e.g., by diminishing their 
prospects when they may later be considered for judgeships or other public offices. In 
the future, however, attorneys who cannot conform to the proper norms of 
professional behavior, whether inside or outside the courtroom, should recognize they 
are assuming the risk of formal, public censure in our opinions.”).  But see Ken 
Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Break Rules, Be Promoted, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 14, 1999, at 
N1 (describing how three prosecutors who had been castigated by courts for 
misconduct were promoted in their own office and subsequently elected judges). 
 182 See Dunahoe, supra note 4, at 73.  However, as many scholars have observed, 
disciplinary boards are often paper tigers that rarely discipline prosecutors for 
misconduct.  See Rosen, supra note 11, at 697 (“[D]isciplinary charges have been 
brought infrequently and meaningful sanctions rarely applied.”); see also Gershman, 
supra note 1, at 445 (similar); Zacharias, supra note 40 (similar). 
 183 Goldshmitt v. State, 490 So. 2d 123, 125-26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (upholding 
such plates for rehabilitation and deterrence reasons rather than to protect public); 
People v. Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146, 149 (N.Y. 1995) (striking down use of DWI 
license plate that was ordered “to ‘warn the public’ of the threat presented by his 
presence behind the wheel”).  Another example, though one that is not a fair 
comparison to conventional prosecutorial misconduct, is sex offender registries designed 
to alert neighborhood parents so as to protect their children.  See Michael Vitiello, 
Punishing Sex Offenders:  When Good Intentions Go Bad, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 651, 680 (2008). 
 184 Massaro, supra note 167, at 1936-43; see also ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND 
SANCTIONS 82-83 (1993) (“A person can endure the deprivation of various goods and 
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than rehabilitate and reintegrate offenders, the punishments drive 
them to more reclusive behavior or, worse yet, into the arms of others 
who have been similarly shamed.185  If this argument is correct, it is 
deeply troubling when applied to criminal defendants because the 
ostracized offender who has been driven to a sub-community of other 
criminals is far more likely to commit future crimes.186   
However, the concern about breeding further misconduct should 
not concern us when we apply shaming to prosecutors.  The 
ostracized prosecutor is likely to take one of two paths.  On the one 
hand, the prosecutor may work hard to regain the trust of her tight-
knit legal community.  By actively working to repair her reputation, 
the prosecutor will not only be extra cautious to steer clear of 
misconduct, but she will probably make efforts to put her ethical 
behavior on display, thus providing a helpful lesson for junior 
prosecutors.  On the other hand, and perhaps more likely, the shamed 
prosecutor may quit her job.187  Just as the patron of a prostitute who 
has been plastered on television or in the newspaper may leave town 
to run from the embarrassment,188 so too may a shamed prosecutor 
leave the district attorney’s office.  The difference, however, is that the 
john who has left town can patronize another prostitute (or descend 
into more deviant behavior) wherever he relocates, whereas the 
shamed prosecutor will have a tough time surviving the vetting 
process to be hired in another county prosecutor’s office.189 
 
liberties with dignity, but it is hard to be dignified while having to carry out abasing 
rituals, whether the lockstep, the stocks, or newer rituals.”). 
 185 Persons, supra note 175, at 1546 (“The primary effect of shame punishments 
may be not to decrease overall demand but to push prostitution either further 
underground or to other communities outside the purview of the shamers.”); see Note, 
supra note 168, at 2198. 
 186 See Massaro, supra note 167, at 1919 (“The stigmatized offender thus may ‘drift’ 
toward subcultures that are more accepting of her particular norm violations.  
Association with the subculture in turn may facilitate future crime, especially for 
crimes that require multiple actors or hard-to-obtain materials, tools, or 
connections.”). 
 187 Shaming a misbehaving prosecutor into quitting is akin to incapacitating a 
criminal to prevent further crimes.  Persons, supra note 175, at 1541 (“[S]haming 
may, under some circumstances, incapacitate the offender from committing certain 
types of crimes.”). 
 188 Id. at 1547. 
 189 Professor Massaro has recognized that offenders can easily move to another 
state to restart their lives following shaming.  See Massaro, supra note 167, at 1935 
(discussing State v. Rosenberger, 504 A.2d 160 (N.J. 1985), in which judge rejected 
shaming punishment for grand theft because offender moved across country, making 
it “probable that his new neighbors are totally unaware of his criminal conduct”).  By 
contrast, lawyers cannot start over so easily in a new state.  They must sit for the bar 
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And although there may be a handful of upstanding prosecutors 
who leave the office prematurely due to excessive fallout from the 
shaming, this risk is likely outweighed by the pedagogical lesson190 to 
junior and senior prosecutors who will see that there are severe 
repercussions for misconduct.191  Put simply, the concern about 
reintegration192 following shaming is not as significant for prosecutors 
as it is for ordinary criminal defendants. 
B. Problems with a Prosecutorial Shaming Approach 
The idea of naming individual prosecutors to shame them is not 
without criticism.  First, scholars have recognized that attempts to 
shame sometimes backfire.  Some police officers, for instance, take 
pride in being seen as aggressive.193  Gang members often consider 
imprisonment and other punishments to be a badge of honor.194   
It is unlikely that the badge of honor problem will occur with 
respect to prosecutors because unlike police officers who have a 
comparatively low turnover rate,195 prosecutors typically have much 
shorter tenures.196  Prosecutors often use their jobs to gain experience 
 
exam or, at minimum, satisfy the character and fitness standards to waive into the bar.  
 190 In this respect, the identification of prosecutors may be justifiable to some 
scholars on the grounds that it truly educates, rather than simply humiliates, 
offenders.  See Garvey, supra note 169, at 784-94 (differentiating between educational 
punishments and creative punishments that merely shame). 
 191 Of course, one could counter that seeing one’s colleague go down in flames 
creates an incentive for misbehaving prosecutors to simply cover their tracks better, 
rather than cleaning up their behavior. 
 192 On the contention that shaming is more successful when it is reintegrative 
rather than purely stigmatic, see JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME, AND REINTEGRATION 
55 (1989) (“[F]or all types of crime, shaming runs the risk of counterproductivity 
when it shades into stigmatization.  The crucial distinction is between shaming that is 
reintegrative and shaming that is disintegrative (stigmatization).”). 
 193 See Armacost, supra note 23, at 517 (“[T]here is a widespread view among law 
enforcement officers that citizens who behave rudely or aggressively, or who use 
insolent or foul language, need to be ‘taught a lesson.’”). 
 194 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE:  THE LEGAL THREAT IN 
CRIME CONTROL 216 (1973) (discussing gangs and noting that “[b]eing punished may 
even become a status symbol”); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 149 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1811, 1817-18 (2001) (discussing how efforts to shame inner-city gangs 
are sometimes turned on their head and seen as badge of honor). 
 195 See David Alan Sklansky, Not Your Father’s Police Department:  Making Sense of the 
New Demographics of Law Enforcement, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1209, 1235-36 
(2006) (“[P]olice departments have low turnover.  The annual quit rate is around 4%.”). 
 196 In New Orleans, Louisiana, for instance, prosecutors typically last no longer 
than two years.  Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 29, 63 (2002). 
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to become (better paid) criminal defense attorneys or to achieve 
enough contacts and prestige to be elected to a judgeship or a political 
office.197  In order to move into these new lines of work, prosecutors 
must be cautious about their reputations not just among their present 
colleagues but also among other private and public constituencies.  
Moreover, past evidence demonstrates prosecutors’ distaste for being 
called on the carpet for misconduct.  When judicial opinions have 
named federal prosecutors, the Department of Justice has even sought 
to have their names removed.198  This hardly suggests that naming 
prosecutors is a badge of honor. 
A second and more compelling objection to prosecutorial shaming 
stems from the lengthy time between the occurrence of misconduct 
and the judicial opinions castigating the misbehavior.  Appellate 
decisions reversing convictions resulting, at least in part, from 
prosecutorial misconduct do not occur overnight.  It often takes years 
for a conviction to be reversed.  This is particularly true for Brady 
claims that are often heard on habeas corpus petitions years after the 
defendant has been convicted.199  And given the short tenure of 
prosecutors, the offending actor will often have moved on by the time 
his or her name is identified.200   
This problem is slightly minimized with respect to death-penalty 
cases and other serious matters, which tend to be tried by more 
experienced prosecutors who have made long-term commitments to a 
district attorney’s office.  Thus, except when these career prosecutors 
have been elected to judgeships201 or retired from the practice of law, 
many of them will still be employed at the prosecutor’s office when the 
shaming occurs.202  Moreover, of those prosecutors who leave the 
 
 197 See Dunahoe, supra note 4, at 59 (“The office of State Assistant District Attorney 
is frequently but one pit stop on the highway to private sector employment.”). 
 198 Consider the Kojayan case, supra notes 32-39 and accompanying text, in which 
the Ninth Circuit acceded the Government’s request to eliminate reference to the 
prosecutor.  Henry Weinstein, Court Will Not Name Reprimanded Prosecutor; Justice:  
Appeals Judges Say Misstatements to Jury Tainted Drug Case.  The Ruling Is Sharply 
Critical of the U.S. Attorney’s Office, But It Will Not Single Out the Offender, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 4, 1993, at 8. 
 199 See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 111 n.205 (2008). 
 200 E.g., Liebman, supra note 8, at 2119-20 (explaining that when cases are 
reversed years after trial, “the individual responsible for the violation very often is 
long gone from the agency”). 
 201 Unfortunately, there are a number of instances in which prosecutors who have 
been reprimanded for misconduct have been elected or appointed to judgeships 
between the time of the misconduct and the time it was identified on appeal.  Id. at 
2120 n.220; Armstrong & Possley, supra note 181. 
 202 A third objection is that as prosecutorial shaming becomes more prevalent, it 
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district attorney’s office, most will go to private practice where their 
reputations among other lawyers and judges still remain crucial. 
In sum, the badge of honor problem and the lengthy time gap 
should not stand in the way of naming prosecutors in order to shame 
their misconduct. 
IV. USING PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT PROJECTS TO PROMOTE 
SHAMING 
If we accept prosecutorial shaming to be a positive idea for rooting 
out and deterring misconduct, the hard question then becomes how it 
can be implemented.  This Part explores where prior reform proposals 
have failed and advocates a path that steers clear of those problems.  
A. Prior Reform Proposals and Their Flaws 
Many scholars and courts have recognized the problem of 
prosecutorial misconduct and the need to deter it.  They have offered 
good proposals, such as creating prosecutor grievance councils that 
would investigate complaints against prosecutors,203 requiring bar 
disciplinary committees to review judicial decisions and institute 
disciplinary proceedings in egregious cases,204 providing greater 
funding for bar disciplinary committees so they can take more 
proactive steps,205 encouraging judges to refer more cases to bar 
 
will have a less powerful impact.  See Netter, supra note 166, at 200 (explaining that 
shaming might be deterrent because of its “circus appeal” and that “over-expansion 
could be self-defeating”).  This danger is very minimal with respect to prosecutors 
because of the relatively small number of cases in which prosecutors are found to have 
committed misconduct. 
 203 See Steele, supra note 60, at 982-88; see also Angela J. Davis, The American 
Prosecutor:  Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 463-
64 (2001) (advocating prosecutorial review board to handle specific complaints and to 
conduct random reviews on routine cases). 
 204 See Rosen, supra note 11, at 735-36; see also Kelly Gier, Prosecuting Injustice:  
Consequences of Misconduct, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 191, 205 (2006). 
 205 Erica M. Landsberg, Comment, Policing Attorneys:  Exclusion of Unethically 
Obtained Evidence, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1399, 1403-04 (1986) (explaining that one way 
to more rigorously enforce rules of professional responsibility is to “provide more 
money for disciplinary agencies” but recognizing that it might be politically 
unpalatable). 
  
1096 University of California, Davis [Vol. 43:1059 
disciplinary committees,206 and encouraging judges to cite prosecutors 
by name much more often.207 
To date, none of those proposals has been successfully 
implemented.  The reason, most likely, is that each proposal requires 
large expenditures of additional money or a challenge to entrenched 
interests.  Establishing a prosecutorial grievance counsel would 
require new legislation to create the body and appropriate funding.  
Prosecutors likely would lobby against it,208 and fiscal conservatives 
would likely oppose additional funding.  The same logic would likely 
apply to additional funding for bar disciplinary committees.209  
Legislators seeking re-election would prefer to spend money on 
measures that target criminals, rather than on policing the people who 
put criminals in prison.210 
Likewise, we cannot expect judges to begin referring more cases to 
bar disciplinary committees or to castigate prosecutors by name in 
judicial opinions simply because legal scholars suggest that they do so.  
As discussed above in Part II.C, there are entrenched reasons why 
judges are reluctant to call prosecutors on the carpet.  Many judges 
were former prosecutors, and there is a general instinct for people to 
protect their own.  Indeed, even among judges who were not 
prosecutors, there is still a reluctance to chastise fellow lawyers.  
Asking judges to voluntarily change their behavior in the face of these 
realities is admirable, but not terribly realistic. 
 
 206 People v. Green, 274 N.W.2d 448, 455 (Mich. 1979) (Williams, J., concurring) 
(“I would affirm but order the Clerk to report this matter to bar grievance authorities 
for appropriate action.”). 
 207 Gier, supra note 204, at 205-06 (“A second proposal would be requiring the 
courts to always publish the names of prosecutors whose cases were reversed for 
misconduct.”).  Gier does not explain who could require courts to name prosecutors.  
Encouraging such naming would be a more viable proposal.  See Medwed, supra note 
8, at 175. 
 208 Like other interest groups in the criminal justice system, prosecutors have an 
effective lobby.  See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 505, 535, 537-38 (2001). 
 209 See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice:  Can 
Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 105 (1991) (recognizing fiscal constraints 
that preclude bar disciplinary committees from actively policing generalized “do 
justice” provisions of ethics code). 
 210 Indeed, as Professor Stuntz has observed, most lawmakers would prefer to avoid 
even spending money on law enforcement if other options, such as harsher 
punishments, can satisfy the public’s appetite instead.  Stuntz, supra note 208, at 525-26. 
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B. Designing Prosecutorial Misconduct Projects 
As we have seen, there is potentially great value to having judges 
publicly name prosecutors when reversing cases for prosecutorial 
misconduct.  Yet as we have also seen, many judges are reluctant to 
take prosecutors to task until they are sure they are dealing with a 
repeat offender.  Accordingly, I propose an alternative approach in 
which law schools establish Prosecutorial Misconduct Projects that 
would review appellate decisions finding prosecutorial misconduct but 
failing to name the offending prosecutors. 
First, consider the model the projects would be based upon:  
Innocence Projects.  The original Innocence Project began at the 
Benjamin Cardozo School of Law in New York City over fifteen years 
ago as an effort to exonerate innocent prisoners using DNA 
technology.211  Under the leadership of Barry Scheck and Peter 
Neufeld, the Innocence Project has grown into a 501(c)(3) nonprofit 
corporation212 that has a staff of more than forty employees.213  It has 
spread to include numerous related projects in forty-one other states, 
the District of Columbia, and four foreign countries.214  To date the 
Innocence Project has been instrumental in freeing many of the more 
than 200 inmates (including sixteen sentenced to death) who have 
been exonerated in the United States in recent years.215  The Innocence 
Project movement has even led some states to establish innocence 
commissions as quasi-administrative agencies to investigate claims of 
innocence as well as explore systemic flaws in the criminal justice 
process.216  In light of courts’ resistance to free-standing claims of 
actual innocence,217 the Innocence Project and state-created innocence 
commissions have been an important addition to the legal landscape.  
Prosecutorial Misconduct Projects would fill a similar gap by 
identifying misbehaving prosecutors that appellate judges are 
unwilling to name.  Under the supervision of a faculty supervisor, law 
 
 211 The Innocence Project, About the Organization, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
Content/9.php (last visited Jan. 13, 2009).  
 212 Id. 
 213 The Innocence Project, Innocence Project Staff, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ 
about/Staff-Directory.php (last visited Jan. 13, 2009). 
 214 The Innocence Project, Other Projects Around the World, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/Other-Projects.php (last visited Jan. 13, 2009). 
 215 The Innocence Project, supra note 211.  
 216 See Garrett, supra note 151, at 435-37. 
 217 See id. at 435-36; see also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) (rejecting 
argument that free-standing claims of actual innocence should be cognizable on 
federal habeas corpus review). 
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students would review cases from their jurisdiction in which 
convictions were reversed for prosecutorial misconduct.  These cases 
would be easily identified by programming legal databases like 
Westlaw® or LexisNexis® to print cases with key words such as 
“Brady,” “Batson,” or “prosecutorial misconduct.”  If the judicial 
decision identifies the prosecutor by name, project volunteers would 
simply have to write down the prosecutor’s name and a summary of 
the facts.  If the opinion describes prosecutorial misconduct as the 
reason for reversing a conviction but does not name the prosecutors 
who committed the misconduct, the project volunteers would then 
travel to the courthouse to retrieve the trial transcript and search out 
the prosecutors’ names.218  In the event that the transcript is not 
available at the courthouse, the project volunteers could file an open 
records request to determine the names of the prosecutors.219 
Thereafter, the project volunteers would produce a memorandum a 
few times per year that lists the facts of each case and the prosecutors 
who committed misconduct.  The memorandum would also state 
whether the offending prosecutors had been identified for misconduct 
in any cases in prior years.  The completed memorandum could then 
be posted on the organization’s website and sent by hard copy to 
defense lawyers, prosecutors, bar disciplinary committees and, most 
importantly, every criminal court judge in the jurisdiction. 
In a way, the Prosecutorial Misconduct Projects would serve the 
same role as investigative journalism.  Some of the most enlightening 
work on prosecutorial misconduct has been conducted by media 
outlets that have reviewed thousands of cases of alleged prosecutorial 
misconduct.220  This journalism has served a valuable shaming 
 
 218 Obviously, this task would be much more onerous in a geographically 
expansive state with only one law school, for instance, Montana or South Dakota, and 
far easier in a big city like New York or Chicago.  Nevertheless, because courts reverse 
so few cases for misconduct each year, it is likely that project volunteers would not 
have to travel much.  
 219 This approach was recently used successfully by Texas Lawyer magazine to 
gather the names of Dallas County prosecutors who handled cases resulting in 
wrongful imprisonment of those later determined to be innocent.  See John Council, 
Witnesses to the Prosecution:  Current and Former ADAs Who Helped Convict Exonerated 
Men Reflect, TEX. LAW., June 9, 2008, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/tx/ 
PubArticleTX.jsp?id=1202421991854. 
 220 E.g., Armstrong & Possley, supra note 12 (reviewing thousands of homicide 
cases and finding 381 convictions that were reversed because prosecutors concealed 
evidence or presented evidence they knew to be false); Bill Moushey, Out of Control:  
Legal Rules Have Changed, Allowing Federal Agents, Prosecutors to Bypass Basic Rights, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 22, 1998, at A1 (reviewing numerous cases); Mike 
Zapler, State Bar Ignores Errant Lawyers, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Feb. 12, 2006, at A1 
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function in and of itself.  However, while it is wonderful to have the 
media do the shaming, only a handful of media outlets have the 
resources to conduct such projects, and those organizations can only 
afford the time and column space to do so very infrequently.221  And 
even when media outlets do undertake investigative journalism the 
findings are sometimes dismissed as the product of an organization 
with an axe to grind.222  Perhaps for this reason, media shaming, 
whether it be large-scale exposés or standard news stories focusing on 
high-profile cases,223 has not been an effective tool to punish and deter 
prosecutorial misconduct.224 
By contrast, Prosecutorial Misconduct Projects would face fewer 
obstacles. Because they would be based on reported decisions, the 
otherwise difficult step of identifying the relevant cases would simply 
involve programming Westlaw® or LexisNexis® to identify the key 
cases.  Additionally, because law students would be guided by 
appellate judges’ reversals of convictions (rather than personally 
 
(reviewing nearly 1,500 state disciplinary actions and finding that just one involved 
prosecutorial misconduct); CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, supra note 46 (reviewing 
more than 11,000 cases of alleged misconduct). 
 221 Moreover, taking out advertisements in the media may be prohibitively 
expensive.  See Skeel, supra note 194, at 1849 (discussing $100,000 price tag for 
shareholder activists to take out very effective shaming advertisement against passive 
directors of Sears, Roebuck & Co.). 
 222 See, e.g., John C. Luttrell, Letter to the Editor, Looking for Victims, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 20, 2007, at 13A (arguing in letter to editor that newspaper 
exposé about overcrowding in county jail was “attempting to cram some ridiculous 
agenda down our throats”).  For the original report, see Jacob H. Fries, Burden on the 
Block:  A Times Special Report, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 14, 2007, at 1A (detailing 
awful conditions experienced by journalist who spent 48 hours in overcrowded 
Pinellas County jail, which was built for 2,400 occupants but housed 3,800 people). 
 223 See Dunahoe, supra note 4, at 73 (“[M]edia attention will most likely focus on 
only the most egregious prosecutorial violations.”). 
 224 See DAVIS, supra note 1, at 171-72 (explaining that media coverage of 
prosecutorial misconduct has not led to significant public response, but recognizing 
that “[o]ne reason may be that there has not been sufficient reporting of prosecutorial 
misconduct in the news media”).  Additionally, the media plays to a general audience 
and that may be the wrong target group.  While outrage by the general public is a way 
to trigger major change, it is a very challenging route to travel, especially when the 
public already has positive preconceived impressions of prosecutors and negative 
feelings toward assisting criminal defendants any further.  See id. at 174-76 
(discussing over-reporting of crime and glorification of prosecutors on television 
shows such as Law and Order).  A better approach may be to exclusively target the 
community more familiar with prosecutors and more able to exert formal and 
informal pressure over them:  defense lawyers, other prosecutors, bar disciplinary 
committees, and, most importantly, judges. 
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deciding whether there had been misconduct), it would be far more 
difficult for critics to accuse them of having an axe to grind.225   
Moreover, while the media focuses on disseminating information to 
the general public, the Prosecutorial Misconduct Projects would target 
a much narrower audience:  the power brokers in the criminal justice 
system.  As Professor Stephanos Bibas has explained, there is a 
dramatic gulf between the knowledge of key players in the criminal 
justice system and the general public.226  The media often exacerbates 
this problem rather than narrowing the gap.227  Thus, the prospect of 
challenging entrenched opinions through media coverage is far less 
desirable than attacking it by providing greater information to the 
power brokers within the system.  And as I argue below, providing 
greater information to the key players can have considerable benefits. 
C. Greater Information Flow Leads to Greater Supervision of 
Prosecutors Who Have Committed Prior Misconduct 
The criminal justice system suffers from poor information flow.228  
Insiders and particularly outsiders operate with information deficits 
that limit their ability to make good decisions.229  Prosecutorial 
Misconduct Projects would serve an information-forcing function that 
could ameliorate the problem. 
As Professor Fred Zacharias has recently explained, in the criminal 
justice system most criminal defendants are not sophisticated 
consumers of information.  Rather, they rely on word of mouth from 
limited sources to find a lawyer.230  Thus, choosing a defense lawyer 
 
 225 However, merely identifying information publicly can have far-ranging and 
unanticipated private consequences if private actors get carried away with themselves.  
See Seth Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlett Letters:  The Tension Between Privacy 
and Disclosure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 36-61 (1991) (describing 
impact of government disclosures of sensitive information). 
 226 See Bibas, supra note 162, at 916. 
 227 See id. at 925-26 (explaining how crime dramas and news reports of high-
profile crimes skew public perceptions on everything from sentencing to how muddy, 
aggravating, and mitigating facts of individual cases can be).  As Professor Bibas 
explains, while “[t]he best way to counteract misleading information is with more and 
better information,” the problem is that “spreading better information among the 
general public is not easy to do.”  Id. at 955-56. 
 228 See generally Adam M. Gershowitz, An Informational Approach to the Mass 
Imprisonment Problem, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 47 (2008) (arguing that prosecutors are not 
cognizant of resources held by rest of criminal justice system, particularly number of 
prison beds, when making plea bargaining decisions). 
 229 See Bibas, supra note 162, at 921-24. 
 230 See Zacharias, supra note 61, at 174-75. 
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requires reliance on a lot of signaling, much of it based on the lawyer’s 
reputation.  And much of it is inaccurate.231  Perhaps for that reason, 
scholars have applauded the recent rise of third-party entities that rate 
lawyers and thus provide greater information to the consumers who 
might hire them.232 
At first blush, Professor Zacharias’s observations may not seem 
relevant to prosecutors because their client — the State — hires them 
only once and typically only after an exhaustive and informed 
interview process.  Yet we need to be concerned not just with the 
hiring committee, but also with the other prosecutors and the judges 
with whom the new hire will work. 
Individual prosecutors rotate between different courts to give them 
exposure to different senior prosecutors and different judges (and, 
although this is not the reason for moving them, to different defense 
lawyers as well).233  There is certainly some scuttlebutt in the 
courthouse about individual prosecutors, but many judges, senior 
prosecutors, and defense lawyers receive little or, worse yet, inaccurate 
information about prosecutors arriving in new courts.  The lack of 
information phenomenon is amplified when state prosecutors transfer 
to the United States Attorney’s Office or to a nearby county’s office, as 
they often do.234 
With a lack of objective or first-hand information, supervising 
prosecutors and judges will extend the long leash of plea bargaining 
power based on prosecutors’ reputations.235  Those reputations may 
well be accurate.  However, it is also quite possible that judges and 
supervising prosecutors may be unaware of a subordinate’s 
misconduct in other courtrooms.  These judges and supervising 
prosecutors may have no idea that Prosecutor X, who is fairly new to 
 
 231 See id. at 176-83. 
 232 See, e.g., Colleen Petroni, Comment, Third-Party Ratings as Modern Reputational 
Information:  How Rules of Professional Conduct Could Better Serve Lower-Income Legal 
Consumers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 197, 223 (2007) (“[T]hird-party rating systems can 
provide important and useful reputational information to consumers.”).  
 233 Rotation is a recommended practice to avoid too much coziness between 
prosecutors and judges.  Flowers, supra note 151, at 290 (“[P]rosecutors should be 
rotated from courtroom to courtroom to avoid developing an intimate relationship 
between the prosecutor and the court.”). 
 234 The United States Attorney’s Office in Tampa evidently lacked much knowledge 
about Karen Cox, who quickly committed misconduct upon arriving in the office.  See 
supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 235 See Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1409, 1414 (2003) (“In most systems, the routine work of individual 
prosecutors receives little review, and thus line prosecutors exercise personal as well 
as institutional discretion.”). 
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their courtroom, had one of his cases reversed on appeal last year for 
failure to turn over exculpatory evidence, particularly if Prosecutor X 
was not named in the judicial opinion. 
Information forcing by a third-party entity such as a Prosecutorial 
Misconduct Project will help to take those judges and supervising 
prosecutors out of the dark.  Once the key players see a prosecutor’s 
name on a circulated list of prosecutors who have been reversed for 
misconduct,236 they will be far more careful in extending the plea 
bargaining leash and trusting the prosecutors’ representations at 
trial.237  Defense lawyers will (hopefully)238 check more carefully into 
the prosecutors’ representations about the case.239  For cases that go to 
trial, senior prosecutors, both out of a sense of justice and a desire to 
avoid reversal, will double-check to ensure that all favorable evidence 
has been turned over to the defense, rather than relying on 
representations by the new prosecutor.  And judges will keep a more 
watchful eye for they too will be extremely concerned about not only 
justice being done but also a decision being reversed.240 
At minimum, the benefits of Prosecutorial Misconduct Projects will 
be twofold:  (1) identifying all, rather than a fraction of, the 
 
 236 In a way, naming prosecutors is like the doctrine of chances that prosecutors 
sometimes use against defendants.  That doctrine posits that “evidence of the 
repetition of similar unusual events over time demonstrate a decreasing probability 
that those unusual events occurred by chance.”  Martin v. State, 173 S.W.2d 463, 467 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see also Gier, supra note 204, at 206 (explaining how defense 
lawyers attempted to use doctrine of chances against Texas prosecutor who they 
accused of misconduct). 
 237 See Massaro, supra note 167, at 1900 (“Publicizing the offender’s identity may 
alert community members of her criminal past and cause them to isolate her socially 
or professionally.  People might, for example, refuse a convicted embezzler a position 
that gives her access to funds.”). 
 238 Unfortunately, many appointed defense lawyers are paid at rates so low that 
they have a financial disincentive to do anything more than simply plea out the case.  
See, e.g., Adam M. Gershowitz, Raise the Proof:  A Default Rule for Indigent Defense, 40 
CONN. L. REV. 85, 95-96 (2007). 
 239 As Professors Wright and Miller explain, “with so little defense attorney time to 
spread among so many cases, it will be an exceptional case where the defense lawyer 
adds much to the prosecutor’s view of the facts and the law, particularly when the 
prosecutor has actually spoken to witnesses and envisioned a possible trial.”  Wright 
& Miller, supra note 235, at 1414.  Thus, as Professor Bibas explains, “The result of 
inadequate discovery is that the parties bargain blindfolded.  They bargain in whatever 
shadow of trial they can discern, but they can easily go astray based on bluffing, 
puffery, fear, and doubt.”  Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of 
Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2495 (2004). 
 240 But see Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same 
Thing Everyone Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 14-15 (1993) (arguing that fear of 
reversal is overrated among most judges). 
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misbehaving prosecutors, and (2) clearly identifying repeat offenders 
by name, rather than relying on word of mouth and office gossip to 
keep the key players in the criminal justice system informed. 
With respect to the first point, recall that data from a Center for 
Public Integrity report indicate that less than twenty-six percent of cases 
reversing convictions for prosecutorial misconduct named the 
prosecutor.241  And as described above in Part II.A-B, even in death-
penalty reversals courts name prosecutors in less than 50% of cases.  
Prosecutorial Misconduct Projects would raise this percentage to all or 
nearly all cases. 
Second, and more important than simply naming names, the 
Prosecutorial Misconduct Project could put that information in the 
hands of judges and other actors who can use it.  While judges around 
the country might be aware of a handful of prosecutors practicing in 
their courts who have a reputation for playing foul, it is highly 
unlikely that they are aware of all the repeat offenders, even the ones 
who have been called out by courts in judicial opinions.  Most trial 
judges lack the time to read every appellate case issued in their 
jurisdiction, and virtually no judge has time to scour the opinion 
carefully enough to spot a prosecutor’s name if it is mentioned only 
once or twice.242  This is to say nothing of the lack of institutional 
knowledge of judges recently elected or appointed to the bench.  By 
contrast, a Prosecutorial Misconduct report that keeps a running tally 
of each time a prosecutor was reversed for misconduct will very clearly 
signal to judges who the repeat offenders are.  And there are a 
significant number of repeat offenders.   
For example, during a seven-year period, Texas’s highest criminal 
court reversed the convictions of five defendants (from five separate 
cases) based on improper prosecutorial argument by Dallas County 
Assistant District Attorney Robert Whaley.243  Given that ADA Whaley 
 
 241 See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 242 By way of comparison, one observer has argued that conventional publicity 
shaming will fail because “even in close-knit communities, most people do not closely 
examine each page of the local newspaper for information about their neighbors’ 
indiscretions.”  Note, supra note 168, at 2196. 
 243 Robillard v. State, 641 S.W.2d 910, 911-12 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (reversing 
conviction because prosecutor improperly offered his own personal opinion about 
defendant’s written statement); Campbell v. State, 610 S.W.2d 754, 756-57 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1980) (reversing conviction because prosecutor’s argument to jury 
included prejudicial statements not supported by evidence in case); Wright v. State, 
609 S.W.2d 801, 802-06 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (reversing conviction because 
prosecutors brought impermissible and prejudicial matters before jury); Lewis v. State, 
529 S.W.2d. 533, 534-35 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) (reversing conviction because of 
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undoubtedly handled thousands of cases during this time period (and 
likely handled the vast majority without any allegations of 
prosecutorial misconduct), it is doubtful that all of the judges he 
practiced in front of would have been aware of his penchant for 
pushing the bounds of permissible argument.244  Had those judges 
been provided with a list of prosecutors whose cases had been 
reversed, they likely would have kept him on a tighter leash in his 
statements and arguments to juries. 
Or consider how a Kansas City prosecutor — James Humphrey — 
managed to be reversed twice (and to earn the attention of the Missouri 
Supreme Court on a third occasion) in the early 1980s for attempting to 
define reasonable doubt and shift the burden of proof to the 
defendant.245  More than a decade later, after memories likely had faded 
or judges had retired, a Missouri Court of Appeals again reversed one of 
Humphrey’s cases for improper jury argument.246  Trial judges might 
have kept this prosecutor on a tighter leash if they had received a list 
indicating multiple prior reversals for improper argument. 
To be sure, Prosecutorial Misconduct Projects will not deter all 
prosecutors from misbehaving in the future.  Given that many 
prosecutors commit misconduct accidentally, a certain amount of 
misconduct, even repeat misconduct, is inevitable.  But a Prosecutorial 
Misconduct Project can go a long way to deterring247 individual 
prosecutors by shaming offenders, providing a valuable pedagogical 
lesson for junior attorneys, and at the same time signaling to judges 
 
inflammatory prosecutorial argument suggesting that prosecutors and not defense 
lawyers are more truthful because prosecutors take solemn oath to God to seek 
justice); Davis v. State, 506 S.W.2d 909, 910-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (reversing 
conviction because prosecutor made legal statements to jury that were in 
contradiction to judge’s charge to jury). 
 244 During the time of ADA Whaley’s serial misconduct, there were 17 district 
courts in Dallas County.  TEXAS STATE DIRECTORY:  THE COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO 
DECISION-MAKERS IN TEXAS GOVERNMENT 99-106 (1980).  With elections and 
retirements, not to mention visiting judges, those 17 courts would have been staffed 
by dozens of different judges over a seven-year period. 
 245 See State v. Shelby, 634 S.W.2d 481, 484 (Mo. 1982) (reversing conviction); 
State v. Jones, 615 S.W.2d 416, 420 (Mo. 1981) (same); State v. Burnfin, 606 S.W.2d 
629, 631 (Mo. 1980) (finding prosecutor’s argument erroneous but upholding 
conviction under plain error doctrine because defendant failed to object at trial). 
 246 See State v. Gonzales, 899 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995). 
 247 Despite the burgeoning shaming literature, there is no more than conjecture as 
to the deterrent effect of shaming.  See Kahan, Alternative Sanctions, supra note 167, at 
639-40.  Nevertheless, anecdotal evidence, such as the decline of prostitution 
following the publication of those convicted of soliciting, seems to indicate a deterrent 
effect.  See id.  
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that they are dealing with prosecutors who need to be monitored more 
carefully. 
CONCLUSION 
If prosecutorial misconduct is serious enough to overturn a criminal 
conviction, then trial judges, defense lawyers, and other prosecutors 
should know the identity of the offending prosecutor.  Yet, appellate 
judges usually refrain from identifying prosecutors by name.  The 
reasons for judges’ reluctance to name likely have to do with their 
status as former prosecutors and a desire not to chastise fellow 
lawyers.  These reasons have explanatory power but they are not 
adequate reasons to allow misconduct to be swept under the rug.  
Prosecutors who commit reversible misconduct should be named and 
publicly shamed for their misdeeds.  It is unlikely that trial and 
appellate judges will voluntarily change their long-time practice of 
keeping prosecutors’ names out of judicial opinions.  To fill the 
vacuum, independent third parties, specifically, Prosecutorial 
Misconduct Projects, should identify unnamed prosecutors and 
provide a regularly updated list of offenders and their misconduct to 
the key players in the criminal justice system.  Such Prosecutorial 
Misconduct Projects would shame bad actors, educate younger 
prosecutors, and enable judges to keep a closer watch on prior 
offenders so as to avoid misconduct in future cases. 
